This is perhaps the first time that Turkey’s ruling authority and president have used their legal power to interfere in the appointments and retirements of Turkish generals during the annual four-day meeting of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ), which entered into deadlock yesterday, the day it should have ended without any crisis. But this was not the case at the time this column was written.
The YAŞ crisis has centered on the civilian authority’s opposition to the promotions of 11 generals and admirals because they face charges over the Sledgehammer (Balyoz) coup plot to unseat the government. In any case, Article 65 of the Personnel Law of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) precludes their promotions. But the TSK insists that they should be promoted, disputing the civilian prosecutors’ indictment.
At the center of the crisis is Gen. Hasan Iğsız, the 1st Army commander in İstanbul who is among the 11 generals and admirals whose promotions the civilian authority opposes. The civilian authority and President Abdullah Gül, who has to approve the YAŞ decisions, have been against Iğsız’s appointment as the new Land Forces commander, replacing Gen. Işık Koşaner. Koşaner was chosen the new chief of General Staff, replacing Gen. İlker Başbuğ, who will retire.
As we said, civilian-military relations have sometime been under the spotlight. Against this background, will the TSK under Gen. Koşaner be more obedient to civilian authorities, as has been the case in other NATO countries? If Parliament and civilian authorities change the law to make the equation in favor of civilian elected authorities, the TSK under Koşaner may become less autonomous and more accountable and transparent. Otherwise, a bitter power struggle will continue.
Gen. Koşaner, having received the same ideological education of the TSK, which still sees itself as the guardian of the secular principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, and which staged five different types of military interventions in Turkish politics, is not expected to be any different than other top commanders in challenging the supremacy of the rule of law.
Since he made a speech two years ago in which has emphasized the TSK’s customary ideological policy, Gen. Koşaner has kept quiet. His quietness has been a deliberate choice of the top command to prevent him from being worn out, as he was scheduled to become the new chief of General Staff after Gen. Başbuğ.
It is no secret that Gen. Başbuğ has been worn out after defending the generals and other officers who have been named suspects in plotting coups. The European Union’s Progress Report of October 2009 stated that Gen. Başbuğ had interfered in the judicial process concerning the coup plot investigations.
A strong political will needs to emerge for the TSK to come under full civilian democratic control. Otherwise, whoever becomes the top commander will not change the ideological mentality of the military.
Further legal changes are required, such as affiliating the TSK with the Ministry of Defense, adopting the Court of Auditors Law to make sure military expenditures are accountable and transparent, rewriting the military curriculum to focus on military education rather than ideological education, and ensuring the reorganization of the military to make it smaller but more mobile and lethal.
Overall, the TSK should be brought into a position of being accountable to Parliament and civilian authorities.
NATO member Turkey’s TSK is behind the times and it is highly crucial to transform it into a military that meets 21st century standards.
