While the region is of increasing geostrategic importance, it is also one of the EU’s most fragile neighbors, facing severe problems, including frozen conflicts, economic underdevelopment, corruption and weak rule of law. Unfortunately, the region has consistently received inadequate attention from the EU, which continues to have a half-hearted approach with no serious strategy.Responsibility toward the stability, security and prosperity of the South Caucasus and its citizens needs to be displayed both by the countries themselves and the EU. Presently the EU’s leverage is limited because there is no common political view regarding the region. European decision-makers continue to underestimate the dangers stemming from the security threats even though they have been pointed out by NGOs and others for a long time, including, most recently, by the European Parliament. In its May 2010 resolution on the South Caucasus, it was recommended that the EU increase its presence, including in the resolution of frozen conflicts. While these conflicts are not the only challenge the EU has to confront, they are without doubt the main obstacle to the transformation of the region.
The EU is inconsistent and many of its messages are fuzzy and confusing. On the one hand the EU recognizes that in order to achieve its goals it needs to offer more sweeteners. Hence the decision to launch association agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia which are aimed at strengthening political and economic ties. Only a short time ago, to receive the offer of an association agreement, countries had to meet all sorts of criteria, including on democracy and freedoms (as was the case with Ukraine, which waited years). The countries of the South Caucasus have been fast-tracked into association agreements talks and, yes, this is good news.
However, at the same time only a few weeks earlier, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton announced that she was planning to scrap the EU special representatives to the South Caucasus and Moldova. It seems to have been rather a snap decision without much thought (or explanation) as to how it would be received by the countries. However, given that this decision must be taken by the member states and by unanimity, it has not yet been finalized. Rather, mandates have been extended for a further six months. This seems to have been a result of the popularity of Kalman Mitzei, the special representative for Moldova, with a number of member states carrying out some sort of “demarche” to keep him in the role longer.
This had a knock on effect on Peter Semneby, the EU special representative for the South Caucasus, who will be able to continue his buzzing shuttle diplomacy sometime longer even though -- for all his honorable efforts -- he has been able to achieve very little. What happens after that is still unclear, but there are fears that it would be downgrading rather than upgrading the EU’s presence in the region. It is therefore up to the EU to prove this analysis wrong and that the new setup will strengthen and not weaken the role of the EU there.
And while the EU is at least involved in the Geneva Process in Georgia, its role in the most dangerous conflict in the region, between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the province of Nagorno-Karabakh, is non-existent (other than France being one of the three mediators in the peace talks). Sooner or later, the EU will be required to play a bigger role as it did in the post-Dayton Balkans. Therefore, it would seem more logical for the EU to involve itself earlier rather than later.
Furthermore, while the European Parliament’s South Caucasus resolution called for an EU presence on the ground in Karabakh, especially at the line of contact, citing this would greatly reduce the risk of cease-fire violations and renewed conflict. In reality, this would be extremely difficult to achieve given that Armenia and Azerbaijan are still at war, with 20,000 Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers eyeballing each other from trenches on either side of the “line of contact” -- in some places no more than a few meters apart. Therefore, putting an EU peacekeeping mission into this would be extremely difficult. Furthermore, it is very likely that the Russians would object to it, insisting on their presence in such a mission.
While it will not be easy, peace in the South Caucasus requires more active EU engagement, as was the case in the Balkans. It is important to develop a similar strategic vision for the South Caucasus, which would make it easier for their leaders to persuade their societies on the need for compromise. The EU is now at a major juncture in the development of its international diplomatic profile and capabilities with the establishment of the European External Action Service. It should ensure that this transition will result in the EU having a stronger role in the South Caucasus, not a weaker one, and that Brussels will develop a coherent and comprehensive EU strategy for this region along the lines outlined in the European Parliament’s resolution of May 2010, as it could prove to be one of the earliest test cases for the new setup.
