Before I get to the second factor – how and why Turkey wants to contain Iran – let me once again briefly summarize the first factor that I tried to explain in my previous column. In essence, Ankara believes economic sanctions never work. Turkey is not alone in that stance. Most of the scholarly literature and evidence on sanctions point to the same conclusion: Sanctions are an extremely weak policy instrument in terms of achieving desired outcomes. In fact, they most often have unintended consequences and create the opposite impact, such as strengthening the very regime you want to weaken.In the case of Iran, for instance, if the goal is to weaken the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), economic and financial sanctions may end up playing into their hands by creating more scarcity in the country. More scarcity will create more smuggling. Those who can smuggle are usually the ones who have connections within the system. This is a vicious cycle whereby the IRGC, which is already a state within the state, will gain more political and economic power. This is why the so-called smart sanctions that are supposed to hurt the regime and spare the masses will end up helping the IRGC and consolidate its grip on power. In short, sanctions, no matter how smart they get, will always alienate larger segments of society and help the well connected. But beyond these dynamics, Turkey is concerned that once sanctions are in place, a coercion-oriented mindset leaves no room for effective diplomacy. In other words, Turks don’t believe in a carrot-and-stick approach to Iran. As an Iranian colleague of mine once quipped: “Carrots and sticks are for donkeys. They simply won’t work with a civilization that is one thousand years older than America.” And beyond sanctions themselves, Ankara is concerned is about what comes next. Turkish policymakers have seen what happened in Iraq. Once diplomatic coercion failed, the next step was military coercion.
All this brings us to the second factor driving Ankara’s Iran policy: the need to contain Iran. This is an important point, often lost to Western analysts who tend to interpret Turkey’s Iran policy as a sign of pro-Islamic solidarity. In reality, Ankara has no desire to see Iran turn into “the” regional superpower with a nuclear capability. Let’s not forget the centuries of imperial rivalry between the Ottoman and Safavid dynasties. Yes, the border between Turkey and Iran is the oldest one in the region, and relations between the two countries have been calm for the last 400 years. But scratch the surface a little, and you will see that there is not much love between Sunni Turks and Shia Persians in popular culture.
The same goes for politics. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), deep down, is a Sunni party that shares the concerns of fellow Sunnis in the Middle East about the rise of a Shia crescent. For instance, the last thing Ankara wants to see in the region is an Iraq dominated by Iran. This is in great part why Turkey supported Allawi’s Iraqiya in the last Iraqi elections. Like most Sunni regimes in the region Ankara accuses Washington of having delivered Baghdad to Iran on a silver plate. Ankara is also angry with Washington for not understanding a basic reality about the Middle East: letting the Arab-Israeli peace process fall apart in the last 10 years benefitted the likes of Ahmedinejad and Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizballah. Iran and Hizballah have been able to win the hearts and minds of the Arab street in Cairo, Amman, Damascus, etc.
In that sense, a clear strategic goal of Turkey is to contain Tehran’s influence. Turkey is doing so by successfully cultivating Damascus and slowly co-opting Hamas. Turkey’s recent spat with Israel has also transformed Recep Tayyip Erdoğan into a hero in the eyes of the Arab street at the expense of Hassan Nasrallah and Ahmedinejad. Trying to strengthen moderate elements in Tehran that want dialogue with Washington is also part of the Turkish strategy. Sadly, this Turkish policy of containing radical influences in Iran is not well understood in Washington.
