It is also increasingly becoming clear that, as there is a PKK problem apart from the Kurdish problem, there is an ‘Abdullah Öcalan problem,’ the problem of the leader of the PKK imprisoned on İmralı Island for the past 11 years.” What I meant by that statement is perhaps best explained by Hüseyin Yıldırım, a former supporter and lawyer of the PKK who currently lives as a political refugee in Sweden, in an interview he recently gave to the Taraf daily. Yıldırım’s statements can be summed up by the following quote:“Öcalan established his authority through the use of force and violence. Those who dared to criticize him have either fled the organization or were killed. … Öcalan controls the PKK, but the Turkish deep state controls Öcalan. After being imprisoned on İmralı Island, he made a deal with the deep state in order to save his own life. They provided him with the program he is implementing. … It is obvious that he surrendered to the deep state after being captured. One has to be blind not to see this. … He has gone as far as trying to get the Kurdish people to admire Mustafa Kemal and Kemalism. He even called Kurdish uprisings reactionary. … If you ask me if the PKK leadership on the Kandil Mountains has any relationship with Ergenekon, I cannot honestly say … Öcalan calls on the PKK ‘to fight if it can … ‘ Upon which they [the PKK] go and attack Reşadiye. But, Murat Karayılan [the PKK’s leader in the Kandil Mountains] has a different discourse. He made two statements on the attack in Reşadiye, saying, ‘It was not a centrally taken decision. We are still investigating why they did it. …’ It is clear that the deep state wants the chaos and the armed insurgency to continue. Its hope is to topple the Justice and Development Party [AKP] government. … Öcalan gives the orders and Kandil executes them. … The people in the [Kandil] Mountains see Öcalan as a means to deal with the state for a solution.” (Taraf, July 26-28)
In this context, perhaps it is necessary to remind readers that liberal-minded Kurdish intellectuals have long been convinced and maintained that the PKK has been manipulated by the deep state in Turkey in order to kill off the most treasured sons and daughters of the Kurdish people and to ravage and depopulate their land. Unlike Yıldırım, however, they are convinced that Öcalan has from the outset been under the control of the deep state, an illegal state within the legal one.
Whatever the truth about Öcalan’s role, it is necessary for those determined to put an end to the Kurdish insurgency not only to distinguish between the Kurdish problem and the PKK, but also between the PKK and Öcalan. It is equally necessary to consider that there may indeed be a “deep PKK” within the PKK, as suggested by Helene Flautre, co-chairperson of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, in an article published by this paper on July 27.
I believe those determined to put an end to the Kurdish insurgency need to pay attention to what Karayılan recently told the BBC. He repeated the call he made last summer for an end to the insurgency through negotiations with Ankara. He said, “If the Kurdish issue is resolved in a democratic way through dialogue, we will lay down our weapons.” He added that he would order his fighters to lay down their weapons, under the supervision of the United Nations, if Ankara agreed to a cease-fire and met certain conditions. His demands included “an end to attacks on Kurdish civilians and to the arrests of Kurdish politicians in eastern Turkey.” The BBC reporter underlined that there was, remarkably, no call for the release of Öcalan. He did not, however, fail to threaten Ankara by saying that “if the Turkish government refuses to accept this, we will have to announce independence.” (BBC News, July 21)
I conclude from all of the above that any government in Ankara that is determined to put an end to the Kurdish insurgency has a good chance of succeeding by directly, or indirectly, negotiating with the PKK leadership in the Kandil Mountains -- while continuing to adopt reforms recognizing Kurdish identity in all its essentials and opening, by way of a general amnesty, the way for rank-and-file PKK militants to lay down their arms and to engage in peaceful political activity. To achieve this aim the political cooperation of the United States, Iraq and Iraqi Kurds is surely necessary. It is also necessary to form special units trained in anti-guerilla warfare, which is something long overdue. It would, however, be a grave mistake to rely on military measures alone, as the experiences of the last quarter of a century must have clearly demonstrated. After all, only Turkey’s Kurdish citizens who reject violence as a means for attaining their rights can render the PKK, or any other armed group that may replace it, ineffectual.
