First, Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) Law, gives the TSK the right to protect Turkey against “internal” and external enemies. Thus, the TSK leaders interpret this article broadly and assume a role in the political system for the sake of “protecting the country” against enemies. Here, the TSK expands the definition of enemy to potentially include political parties that are ruling the country, ethnic groups, religious groups, the Armenian issue or even water scarcity. All of these can be a reason for the TSK to get involved in politics.In the name of preparing for a possible danger, the TSK constantly monitors civic activities around the country and thinks that it is part of its job as required by Article 35. Just recently the Star daily reported that TSK officers monitored and reported an indoor soccer match organized by a local group in the town of İskenderun, which shows that the TSK has expanded its role to monitoring indoor soccer matches and tying them to the security of the country. Unfortunately, however, perhaps because it is busy with such nonsensical issues, the TSK not only loses a great number of its soldiers in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) but also loses its prestige as a powerful army.
When it comes to using such information in the political arena, the TSK brings these reports that it collects about citizens of this country to the attention of politicians directly or, from time to time, through a media campaign to weaken one group against another.
Second, the TSK assumes a critical role in the Turkish political system through the National Security Council (MGK). The MGK was designed to bring military and civilian leaders together to discuss problems that exist in Turkey. As you can see, even the idea behind bringing military and civilian leaders together is not democratic. It equates a military general with the democratically elected civilian prime minister or ministers on a base to talk about Turkey’s problems. In a normal democratic country, it is the responsibility of the democratically elected government to maintain security through security institutions, i.e., the military, the police and the national intelligence services. But in the Turkish system, military generals, the prime minster and other ministers, including the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior and the minister of defense, have equal rights to make decisions in MGK meetings. Until 2005, MGK meetings were attended by five generals and four civilians. They made the decisions. Every member of the MGK had one vote and was on an equal footing. Since 2005, thanks to the country’s EU reforms, the civilians form a majority but the military generals still have a say. The worst part of this bizarre relationship is that everyone accepted it as normal and democratic.
Third, Turkish generals do not miss the opportunity to send political messages on the occasion of ceremonies or days of celebrations. For instance, it has almost become a custom for our generals to deliver speeches full of political messages on Aug. 30, Victory Day. These speeches put an emphasis on domestic politics as well as foreign policy issues. For instance, religious revivalism or the Cyprus problem are the two fixed issues that the military generals feel the need to speak about. Moreover, speeches delivered by the generals are not just words; they insist on taking positions when they are appointed to a critical post as commanders. For instance, the current chief of General Staff, Gen. İlker Başbuğ, has since 2006 trumpeted the idea of a looming Islamic danger in Turkey. When he became chief of General Staff, he took active steps to implement his policy through the judiciary. This is one of the reasons why the judiciary has rocky relations with civilian politicians and an awkward interpretation of the law.
