Nevertheless, the sanctions have increased the tension and division between the various different factions of Iran’s elite and leadership, which is currently undergoing something of a crisis in its domestic and foreign policy, and the West should try to manipulate this situation to its advantage where possible.President Ahmadinejad finds himself in an increasingly uncomfortable position these days (following the Turkey-Brazil deal), facing growing pressure from a number of opponents, both from his own conservative camp and elsewhere. The decision of the US to allow the May 17 Turkish-Brazilian-Iranian uranium swap agreement to go through, followed quickly by a push for sanctions, indicates that the US endeavored to exploit the rift to its advantage. It has increased tension between Iran’s movers and shakers as well as forcing Iran to reassess its strategy vis-a-vis the US.
Iran will not back down, and Tehran has already warned that it would not accept the inspection of their vessels in the open seas as part of implementing the new round of sanctions, stating they would counter this in the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz is of great strategic importance as it is the only sea route through which oil from Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar, as well as most of the United Arab Emirates, can be transported. It is unclear how Tehran would respond to one of its ships being searched, but clearly if Iran were to carry out some sort of countermove in the Strait of Hormuz, it would carry the risk of a countermove from the United States, as under no circumstances will the US allow Iran to meddle with the free flow of oil through the strait. This would have serious repercussions for the entire region.
Furthermore, whatever the sanctions do, they cannot seriously directly limit Iran’s nuclear program, nor do they seem powerful enough to raise the costs of the nuclear program so high as to force the Iranian government to re-evaluate its current policy -- Iran still has enough shady friends to find a “third way.” Indeed, Iran might also react to the sanctions by expanding its enrichment process at Natanz, doubling the number of centrifuges producing uranium enriched to 20 percent.
It is also clear that the Russians and Chinese are still trying to sit on the fence. They were adamant that the UN Security Council sanctions avoid broader sections of the Iranian economy that would affect the day-to-day business which could impact on them. Now it will be something of a waiting game to see whether the strength of the unilateral US or EU sanctions combined with those of the UN Security Council manages to bring Iran back to the negotiating table. Personally, I find it highly unlikely, and as usual Russia and China seem to have come out of this quite nicely. They both managed to pay lip service to nonproliferation and the dangers and uncertainties associated with Iran’s nuclear program, but they also managed to demonstrate to Iran that they do not support strong sanctions. Beijing and Moscow can now both claim that they supported the European and American efforts, even though they have undercut any serious sanctions effort, but still manage to profit off their economic ties with Iran. Both China and Russia reacted rather angrily to the unilateral sanctions placed on Tehran by the EU and US and cited their “deep disappointed that neither the United States nor the European Union heeded their calls to refrain from such actions” and have warned the West that it risked losing Moscow’s support for concerted efforts to rein in Tehran’s nuclear activity in the future. At the end of the day, both China and Russia have oil and gas interests in Iran and do not see Iran as a strategic threat, unlike their colleagues in the West.
Not surprisingly, Iran is hardly going to be racing back to the negotiating table. Turkey may again go ahead and attempt another agreement -- Ankara did not back sanctions and probably remains the West’s best chance of brokering a deal with Tehran -- but after the recent quick and somewhat dirty attempt, this may not be very likely. There is also the option that the West could use the one-year anniversary of the disputed Iranian presidential elections to prompt enough domestic strife within Iran that the leadership feels pressured to resume negotiations, but again this seems unlikely. Rather, Iran’s leadership may use the anniversary to promote its nuclear program to the nation. History has shown that sanctions have never proven to be an effective foreign policy tool, and it is highly unlikely the Iranian case will prove to contradict this. What lies ahead is really anybody’s guess.
