The high-level political convergence, the support for it on the Turkish and Arab streets and mutual visits by businesspeople don’t seem to be enough to secure a deeply rooted union. Outside of the flow of hot money from the Gulf countries, the Turkish-Arab rapprochement has not yet led to an increase, outside of the norm, in the foreign trade volume between Turkey and the Arab nations. As it is, the rapprochement in question has not led to an increase in projects for Turkish contractors in Arab countries. In the Middle East’s main sector, energy, Turkish energy firms have also not seen increased projects or contracts. In sectors Turkey is strong in, such as food, automotives, textiles and communications, Turkish investment has not yet begun in the Middle East, either.The banking system between Turkey and the Arab countries is also in a rather bad condition. Turkish businesspeople working in Arab countries generally have to use European bank branches in Arab countries to handle their business with Turkey. As for Turkish banks, they don’t know the Middle East at all; they are just beginning to enter the area, and are not very driven to learn about the region. They act with hesitance when it comes to entering the Middle East. Turkish banks opening branches in the Middle East have only done so to ensure they have a presence in the region. For this reason, they usually assign their least talented staff to their branches in Arab countries. In addition, from commercial law to legal infrastructure, the work done to pave the way for a convergence between Turkey and Arab countries is still insufficient.
The warm interest the Arab public has shown in getting to know Turkey has yet to see reciprocation on the Turkish side. While Arabs travel to Turkey and watch Turkish serials, Turks who embrace the Turkish lifestyle, culture and music still don’t exhibit similar warmth towards Arabs and Arab countries. While Arabs are fast erasing anti-Turkey and anti-Turkish prejudices from their memories, Turks aren’t progressing at the same speed.
Turkish and Arab intellectuals, political movements, youths, academics, civil society organizations and bureaucrats have yet to get to know each other and come together. And there are no mechanisms to bring them together. There is also no support for Turkish-Arab rapprochement coming from the states on either side, international organizations or the private sector. For example, there are hundreds of different mechanisms and sponsoring establishments to ensure Turkish-Greek, Turkish-Armenian and Turkish-EU convergence, but none to support Turks and Arabs drawing nearer to one another. The second reliable source for Arab intellectuals, opposition members and businesspeople is the EU and the US -- not Turkey, yet. In particular, while leftist Turkish intellectuals view Turkish-Greek or Turkish-Armenian rapprochement as “progressive,” they view Turkish-Arab rapprochement as “backwardness” and don’t look sympathetically upon it. Getting to know the Middle East is not yet amongst the dreams of Turkish youth; living or studying in the EU or US is. While Turkish academics have gained an interest in learning Russian with other Western languages -- English, French, Italian, German and Spanish -- they don’t have the same interest in Arabic. There are only around 10 academics, strategists and think-tank members in Turkey who specialize in the Middle East. And these academics and strategists don’t know Arabic or Hebrew or Farsi. They follow the Middle East through English-language sources and generally have completed their doctorates in the United States. The only country in the Middle East in which they have spent long periods of time is Israel, for scholarship opportunities are abundant there.
Turks only know the Middle East through the “problem of Palestine”; they are not concerned with other problems. In Turkey all the political movements and groups, from the far right to the furthest left, have espoused the Palestinian cause. The Turkish intellectual who will stand up for even one wounded Palestinian in Gaza or the West Bank does not show the same level of sensitivity in the face of flowing blood in other parts of the Middle East. For example, Turkish intellectuals aren’t interested in the average 100 people who die in Iraq every day in terrorist attacks, the 1.5 million people who lost their lives in Iraq between 2003 and 2010, or the more than 1 million widows and roughly 3 million orphans in the same country. This painful reality hasn’t led to popularity in Turkey for the Iraqi flag, as is the case with the Palestinian flag.
In short, while Turks and Arabs are drawing closer together with zeal, they must at the same time develop infrastructure, strategies and mechanisms for this convergence other than populism. Otherwise when someone blows the whistle, the friendly game might be over.
