According to a widespread discourse, which even The Economist subscribes to, AKP foreign policy is, if not radically, “mildly Islamist.” Some describe it as “neo-Ottomanism,” a policy that aims to extend Turkey’s sphere of influence to areas once ruled by the Ottomans. Gilles Kepel, a French expert on the Middle East, claims it is not at all neo-Ottomanism, but “neo-caliphatism,” whatever that means. Recently Ömer Taşpınar, a friend of mine whose analyses published on this page I admire, argued that the AKP foreign policy is basically driven by Turkish nationalism (Today’s Zaman, June 14, 2010). I disagree, however, with all of the above, and argue that AKP policies, domestic or foreign, economic or political, are inspired mainly by liberal principles, if not always in a coherent manner. Let me explain.Despite temporary tensions concerning Cyprus in 1964 and 1974, during the Cold War Turkey pursued a policy entirely in line with the US and NATO alliance. The US, in return, did not object to, if not encouraged, military interventions and the restriction of liberties in Turkey. The logic was that the Kemalists were right, in a Muslim country democracy could not survive without bureaucratic tutelage, and loyalty to the Western alliance was, anyway, more important than democracy in Turkey.
When the Cold War was over and the discourse on human rights and democracy prevailed in Europe, Turkey felt out of tune. Due to the prominence of the military, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) growing insurgency, and the legitimacy provided by the Oslo peace process, Ankara based its foreign policy on strategic ties with the US and Israel. Tense relations with nearly all neighboring countries prevailed, and Ankara pursued a foreign policy based mainly on military threats.
With the candidacy to EU membership declared in 1999 and the electoral success of the AKP in 2002 things have changed. Turkey not only began a process of transition from a kind of democracy under bureaucratic tutelage to one based on EU norms, it further liberalized and globalized its economy and reshaped its foreign policy according to a new paradigm, developed by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.
The basic principles of the paradigm are outlined below. The main aim, sooner or later, is accession to the EU. In order to converge with the EU, Turkey needs to democratize its politics and modernize its economy. This necessitates not only achieving “zero problems” with neighbors through diplomacy and economic integration, but also Ankara assuming a mediating role through dialogue and diplomacy and working to solve regional conflicts that threaten its stability and security. The AKP leadership may be devoutly Muslim, but objectively evaluated, the policies they have pursued are not inspired by Islamist or nationalist, but basically liberal ideas. These policies are being fiercely opposed by the nationalistic bureaucracy and opposition parties.
The AKP government has been mostly, if not entirely successful, in its policies. The Republic of Turkey today is a far more democratic, prosperous and respected country. It has peaceful and improving relations with all of its neighbors. One can hardly blame the AKP for not trying to solve the Cyprus problem. Bilateral disputes remain unresolved, but Ankara and Athens have today far closer relations than ever. Normalization with Armenia has not yet been achieved, but there is now more hope on this front. Perhaps most significantly, Turkey’s relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq have vastly improved.
The AKP has done more towards resolving the Kurdish problem, that is, towards recognition of Kurdish identity, than any previous government. Its greatest failure in domestic politics, however, is in not bringing the PKK insurgency to an end. This has more to do with efforts by both Turkish and Kurdish nationalists to undermine a peaceful settlement, rather than a lack of goodwill and resolve on the part of the AKP government.
The single most important failure of AKP government in foreign policy is surely the deteriorating relations with Israel since the Israeli assault on Gaza. It may be said that Turkey’s method of solving problems through dialogue and diplomacy were bound to clash with Israel’s increasingly militaristic methods. That is why the Obama administration in the US is faced with a tough choice (See my column titled “Obama’s choice: Turkish option or the Israeli option”, Feb. 9, 2009.) Israeli governments, encouraged by the Israel lobby and Christian Zionists in the US, assume they can achieve security through subjugation of the Palestinians, and devastation of the region. Washington must, sooner rather than later, recognize that unconditional support for the Israeli government, is, unnecessarily, making the US the subject of growing animosity among the peoples of the region. This terrible mistake has to be corrected. The US must put all its weight behind efforts to achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
