So far there is little evidence of this, particularly in the EU’s own backyard, including the South Caucasus. While one EU institution says one thing, another branch seemly gives a contradictory message. While a few weeks ago the European Parliament adopted a resolution urging for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus, which recommends beefing up what is currently on offer including pushing for the EU to have a greater role in conflict resolution, at the same time a few days ago the EU’s foreign policy czar, Catherine Ashton, called for the abolition of the EU’s special representatives to the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Moldova as part of streamlining EU foreign policy. Not surprisingly this announcement came as something of a shock to the countries of the region that interpreted it as the EU rolling back, rather than increasing, its clout in the region.Indeed representatives of the South Caucasus have often complained that the EU fails to take the region seriously. The EU presently deals with the region via the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, which so far have proved to be a rather lightweight policies that have failed to deliver anything of concrete value and as a consequence have also failed -- for the most part -- to bring the much-desired political and economic transformation and democratization in the countries the policy encapsulates. Furthermore, on conflict resolution, while the EU has taken on a more high-profile role in the conflicts in Georgia -- this was principally as a result of the August 2008 war -- prior to that the EU was quite happy to be a backseat observer. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the EU remains little more than an inactive observer, supporting the negotiating efforts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk group and dong little else.
The European Parliament resolution was a long time coming, and as a result there have been real hopes and expectations that many of the recommendations cited in the resolution would be taken up by the EU both in the council and a commission and that the EU had recognized the need for a stronger and more active role in the region, which is of increasingly geostrategic importance. These days, keeping the region anchored to Euro-Atlantic integration, with an increasingly pushy Russia making a “comeback” in the region, US engagement being rolled back and a rapidly advancing China, is crucial. The EU needs to be at the heart of the region’s transformation and development before it’s too late.
However, the news that Ashton is planning to scrap the EU special representative has not been well received. Indeed the announcement was made without consulting the EU special representative to the region, Peter Semneby, in advance. Although the plan has not yet been officially announced, it would in principle involve the transferring of power from the special representatives to local EU embassies.
This move would represent a fundamental shift in the EU’s authority in the South Caucasus. Presently, Semneby covers all three countries, giving him an important regional mandate. Under the new setup the EU’s ability to carry out multilateral diplomacy may be reduced given that three different ambassadors would be in charge. Furthermore, embassies tend to focus on technical and nitty-gritty issues rather than having expertise (or concern) for conflict resolution. Even beefing up the powers of the new ambassadors would probably not be enough to sustain the current efforts that are being carried out by Semneby, let alone bring into the picture some of the recommendations in the European Parliament’s resolution that may be indicative of the EU’s real intentions there.
While it is clear that EU institutions frequently do not sing from the same hymn sheet, this contradictory approach can only have one result -- to increase skepticism of the EU towards the region and give the impression that the EU views the region through “Russian-tinted” glasses (given that the EU is attempting an Obama-style reset with the men in the Kremlin) rather than increasing confidence. In short, it represents another example of the EU’s divided and mystifying approach to foreign policy.
