When the prime minister of the conservative-right Democrat Party (DP), Adnan Menderes, was hanged together with two other ministers (despite the calls by some Western powers not to hang them), society was divided, torn apart and left with yet another deep wound in the collective memory. It institutionalized a “culture of coup.” Civilian politics, struggling to flourish under fear in the next two decades, was kept on a military leash and treated like an infant, with occasional slaps to the face.One of the key elements of the 1960 coup was, as with its successors, the lack of domestic intelligence to avert it. In a Cold War format, seen as proper for “Turkish reality,” the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) was also kept under the strict control of the army headquarters, which, naturally, served the generals and kept the civilian government(s) in the dark.
It would take decades to loosen this structure. Fast forward to 1992, when Sönmez Köksal, a diplomat, was appointed the head of MİT. The military character of MİT took, after that, a long time to loosen up and change.
One could argue that the change at the top level was helpful. The loyalty scheme has gradually been altered. The flow of information primarily reached the civilian government offices through increased cooperation, and MİT underwent considerable modernization, leaving behind other, military-based domestic intelligence organs in the domain of old-fashioned behavior. And, probably, the change should be seen as a key element in averting open military coups in the ‘90s and this decade because a “balance of delicacy” was established between the civilian and military power centers.
One spectacular example happened in 2003. We learned from the diaries of journalist Mustafa Balbay (used as evidence material in the Ergenekon case) that in late May that year, Şenkal Atasagun, the successor of Köksal as the head of MİT, mentions to a group of journalists over lunch (together with Balbay, İlhan Selçuk, the chief columnist of the Cumhuriyet daily, and İbrahim Yıldız, its editor), that “we receive letters [from İstanbul]. Those in the 1st Army are preparing for a coup; keep your eyes on them.”
When the content of the diaries was made public, the main question was whether or not Atasagun had informed the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He has not denied that he had said those words to journalists, and later on various AKP officials implied that MİT kept the government informed at that time.
MİT’s changing role, and its increased efficiency to be the watchdog of constitutional order, apparently meant a shift in favor of political stability and to disperse fears of military takeovers.
It has also played a key role in the attempts to normalize relations with the Kurdish leaders of Iraq and helped transform ways to combat Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-related terror into a much more civilized and sophisticated domain. This was mainly the hard work of the “silent” but much-admired successor of Atasagun -- Emre Taner.
Coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the infamous coup against the DP government, two key changes have now taken place in the national intelligence structure. Taner leaves his post as MIT boss after five critical years to his deputy, Hakan Fidan. And Muammer Güler, the former governor of İstanbul, has been appointed as the head of the recently established Department of Public Order and Security.
The latter will try to be responsible for coordinating the entire flow of intelligence from various agencies, building a collective memory, working on roadmaps, gathering intelligence and designing strategies for fighting terror.
The choice of Hakan Fidan as the new MİT boss is certainly a fine one and also marks a new turning point, both in the organization’s internal structuring and its relations with the elected governments. Commenting on the appointment, Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasized an unusual point: He said that the primary duty of MİT will be international intelligence gathering and that the work will begin under Fidan. This means that domestic intelligence might be completely (or in part) moved to the police, as a division a la the UK (MI5-MI6) is planned.
Fidan, a former officer with an impressive international academic background, is known as a person very firm on civilian values. While changing the recruitment policies in favor of hiring experts skillful in languages such as Arabic, Russian, Serbian, etc., another duty awaiting him will be reducing the military personnel within MIT, which is at the moment about a half of the staff.
The appointments are more important than they seem. They must be seen in the context of normalization of politics and the increase in the influence of civilian decision-making in Ankara, and they must signal hopes on further progress in democratization.
