Unquestionably, there are significant differences between the party systems of the advanced industrial democracies and of less-developed countries. Although there is no precise cut-off point between the two types of countries, most democracies in less-developed countries have much higher electoral volatility than the advanced industrial democracies. The second major difference lies in the party system and how the parties are rooted and institutionalized in society. The third is the stability of programmatic or ideological linkages between voters and parties. In the semi-democratic context of less-developed countries, programmatic or ideological linkages between voters and parties are weaker. The linkages between voters and candidates are more personality-based, rather than institutionalized, and therefore less satisfactory, stable or uniform.This is why many commentators focus on Kılıçdaroğlu’s personal weaknesses, the dodgy dealings of his children, his shallow approach to international and financial issues and the populist rhetoric of his inaugural speech.
The sudden election of Kılıçdaroğlu by ideological factions in the party indicates fragile programmatic and ideological links between its voters and the leadership. The portrayal of Kılıçdaroğlu as “Gandhi” by some media illustrates that many voters choose candidates on the basis of personal characteristics. This personalization indicates the weak institutionalization of political parties.
Weak institutionalization has adverse effects on democracy. It hampers electoral accountability, which is a key underpinning of democracy. Institutionalized party systems structure the political process to a high degree, yielding party competition, regularity and stability, with less skepticism (which should not be confused with constructive criticism). Institutionalization accords legitimacy to political actors and dealings. It results in fewer floating voters, hence, less likelihood of massive electoral shifts such as those in the last elections in Turkey.
In more institutionalized systems, party organizations are not subordinated to the interests of a few ambitious leaders; they acquire an independent status and value of their own. But institutionalization is limited as long as a party is the personal instrument of a leader or a small coterie. The removal of all but a few members of the leadership team of former CHP Chairman Deniz Baykal and their replacement with deputy Onder Sav’s list of 80 requires no further explanation. Parties dominated by personalistic leaders have frequent supply-side changes, as political elites shift from one party to another; we see this in the shifting allegiances of Rahşan Ecevit and Kamer Genç.
The new leadership of the CHP will not be central in the struggle to expand citizenship. It does not seem to be able to make any serious contribution to societal cohesion. Nor is it fostering its own identity as a democratizing force. This will not lead to a higher level of development or a more stable party system.
In his inaugural speech, without even touching on ethnic, religious and other cultural issues of modern Turkey, Kılıçdaroğlu promised business as usual: political competition without institutionalization for the foreseeable future. This will not only lead to a general atmosphere of authoritarianism in the CHP and potentially to the erosion of democratic gains over time.
For electoral accountability to function well, the political environment must provide citizens with adequate information and choice. Lack of information and choice undercuts electoral accountability. Where electoral accountability suffers, the promise that representative democracy holds, that elected politicians will serve as agents of the voters to advance some common good or to advance the interests of specific constituencies, will be broken.
Voters identify their interests on the basis of their position in society -- class, religion, ethnicity or nationality and urban or rural residence. Implicitly or explicitly, parties advance the interests of different sectors of society, and individuals vote for a party on the basis of these programmatic or ideological interests. So, a voter might cast a ballot because of a politician’s or party’s program even though a competitor is ideologically closer to his or her preferred position. Voting can also be personality-based, without a strong link to the ideology or program of the party. Voters are therefore more likely to drift from one party to the next; this is the problem lying in wait for the CHP now.
