Underline “attempt.” The move to nominate Kılıçdaroğlu as the successor to Deniz Baykal, the “steel man” of the party, was only the first of many arduous tasks that are awaiting those who in silence have been waiting for the moment of change.In appearance, one symmetry has already been achieved. Like Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is currently the most popular politician in the arena, Kılıçdaroğlu is a “man from the street.” Born in Nazımiye, Tunceli (Dersim) province, he knows the torment of growing up not only in poverty but also the suffering of being of Alevi-Kurdish origin (his adversaries in past elections even brought up the subject that one of his grandparents was Armenian, and he did not deny that) and belonging to the utopian ‘68 generation. So, we now have two leaders who speak the language of the people “down there” and are keen on carrying their plight ahead. This might add to the challenges of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) leader.
The focus of the congress was, therefore, what Kılıçdaroğlu would have to say. Despite the escalating hype promoting him in past years as an alternative, the crowds had little chance to experience his oratorical skills -- a key element in Turkish politics. Known for having a “placid voice,” Kılıçdaroğlu began cautiously and ended with much emotion. But it was apparent that he gave all he could, he consumed his entire arsenal of visions and pledges, and one final conclusion might be that he will need to work much more on that.
Looking firm and decided, Kılıçdaroğlu clearly changed the leadership rhetoric, which has dominated the CHP course in particular since 2004-2005. Baykal’s classical “reactionary” strategy and ill-tempered, acrimonious, confrontational style was pushed aside. His politics, based on spreading fear, such as phrasing like “the republic is in grave danger,” was left aside, and instead, Kılıçdaroğlu laid the base on hope. In a clear signal on a prospective party line based on class politics, his address targeted workers, the ill-paid, peasants, the retired, low-income households, the unemployed. His emphasis shifted, too, to the fight against corruption and mismanagement and nepotism. This means that Kılıçdaroğlu believes that the real fight to defeat the AK Party will have to happen in the area of economy and not through the “Islamism vs. secularism” type discourses that identified the CHP over the years. With the emphasis on “corruption, poverty and unemployment,” he hopes that the CHP will win both the lower-middle and middle classes by focusing on their daily, real life issues such as miniscule budgets.
But his speech left many other, even bigger questions remaining. Kılıçdaroğlu did not clarify where he stands regarding basic freedoms, constitutional reform and the democratization process in general. In passing, he rejected “policies based on religion and ethnic identity,” which means he does not think differently from his predecessor. He did not clarify his stance on the ongoing discussions about civilian-military relations, nor did he elaborate on his vision over “social democracy.”
This will leave us with questions. They will be answered, in time, by what will happen inside the CHP. As much as there is a desire to vote for a party on the left that promotes social-liberal values, progressive policies for freedom and human rights (including ethnic identities and religious sensitivities), an open society based on tolerance and the representation of the masses that seek a prosper and stable future, there are also -- among the “root voters” of the party -- those who identify themselves exclusively as Turks, value secularism above anything else and feel concerned about national sovereignty and proud about independence.
It is a very delicate balance. And, sooner or later, the party will have to choose either the path of being a “party of the state” or a “party of a civilian political cause.” The real power struggle, which now begins with the election of officers and sub-leaders, will be a very tough one. The new leader has doubtlessly caught the momentum because the large bulk of the record number of “undecided” voters have now flooded toward him. Yet, this is temporary because, as the congress yesterday showed, all the old figures of the past (Rahşan Ecevit is one of them) have also become hopeful that they might have a place to steer the party toward an even more Kemalist, more “conservative secularist” path. And Baykal’s “fan club” in the party will never back down. This is a serious probability.
Nevertheless, what happens with the CHP raises expectations. As the past five or so years have shown, Turkish politics need to normalize, turn into a ground over which policies based on hope (not fear) should compete and a reasonable symmetry between the main actors be established. The changes in the CHP might bring politics into a consensus on democratization through a civilized discourse. Polarization may start eroding. As a friend of mine said: “At the moment, nobody expects the CHP to become a social democratic party overnight. Let them become democrats, and it shall suffice for the time being.”
