The Turkey-EU-Cyprus triangle

Barring a last-minute upset, hard-liner Eroğlu is expected to win, which is highly unfortunate and puts at risk the peace talks that have been ongoing between Talat and Christofias for the last 18 months. For me, no matter how slim the chance, Talat still offers the best possibility of a future beyond the past. For his entire career, he has never wavered in his desire for Cyprus to be reunified. Even in the run-up to this election, he has shown courage and sincerity in his vision. He could have played a different game with Christofias, but he chose not to. He has shown integrity, which is a rare quality among Cypriot politicians. Early this year the talks intensified and both leaders have been increasingly ready to make compromises, with the two “motherlands,” Turkey and Greece, also pressing strongly for a deal. Furthermore, some taboos have been broken along the way -- Turkish officials have met with Greek Cypriot civil society representatives and the Greek Cypriot church has been welcomed in the north. This was unimaginable only a short time ago.

But clearly concessions are never easy to accept, and this will be reflected in the vote. Moreover, Talat has been let down by the international community and in particular the EU. The promises vis-a-vis direct trade that were made in the aftermath of the failed 2004 referendum on the UN Annan plan (which saw Turkish Cypriots supporting it by 65 percent and Greek Cypriots rejecting it by 76 percent) were not delivered, and this cost him a great deal because he trusted EU leaders to deliver to his people. In this respect, it is even more unfortunate that this election coincides precisely with developments in the EU that could result in these promises finally being delivered. Additionally, the fact that the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population is decreasing (there are more Turkish Cypriots in London than on the island) while the presence of mainland Turks and “mixed” Turkish Cypriots has increased will also be reflected in the election result. Not surprisingly, most of the Turks that came to the island following the 1974 operation support Eroğlu because they believe that Talat has sold them out during the peace negotiations. Under an eventual peace deal, it is very likely that a considerable number will be asked to return to Turkey. Eroğlu does not support the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation-type solution that Talat and Christofias have been negotiating. The worst case scenario is that the talks on the island may totally collapse, and Turkey’s EU process will run aground, given that Turkey only has four negotiating chapters left to open if you consider all those that are blocked by the Greek Cypriots because of Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airspace to the Greek Cypriots until the EU delivers on its promises to the Turkish Cypriots.

However, while it would be depressing to see Talat go, there is a small light at the end of the tunnel. The recent request made by the European Commission for the European Parliament to reconsider the legal basis of the proposed direct trade directive opens the way for the possibility to have it implemented if the European Parliament passes the change, although it would still require a qualified majority in the European Council. The Greek Cypriots will no doubt fight tooth and nail to prevent this happening, but it is not totally impossible. If successful, this should open the way for Turkey to open its ports and airspace to the Republic of Cyprus. This would in turn remove the veto that the Republic of Cyprus currently places on a number of Turkey’s chapters. If all this were to happen, it should in the first place improve the image of the EU amongst Turkish Cypriots, showing that the EU is a credible and trustworthy partner, as well as clearing Turkey’s path to the EU, which should give Turkey an even greater incentive to get a deal in place on the island. In this scenario, Mr. Eroğlu may find his tough approach difficult to maintain.