Process (mis) management

But the crucial focus is on how to save the process of normalization between Turkey and Armenia, jeopardized to the point of being destroyed because of the Turkish fury over the resolutions. The concern is more than justified; finding excuses to resort to drastic measures on the topic or postpone the addressing of the problems altogether is still key in terms of Turkish political parties being able to pass a critical threshold.

Although the future looks gloomy, there are still chances to keep the process on track and even accelerate it. But to do so, all the efforts must be concentrated and be built on the wisdom of not repeating the mistakes which have marked the course of the process since the signing ceremony in Zurich. All the parties involved in the process have been responsible, to varying degrees, for those mistakes -- except the Russians.

One of the most dramatic steps, at this stage, would be if Yerevan now decided to pass the protocols in its parliament, without waiting for Turkey to do so. It would certainly push Ankara further into a corner. But whether or not it will happen is open to speculation. Some circles there believe that such a step would mean “offering an outstretched hand, but having to wait would cause diplomatic embarrassment and humiliation.” Others disagree.

It is rumored that Washington is now busy working on a new modality -- a new roadmap. It should. Turkish diplomats, while discussing in frustration the future of the process, keenly point out that the Obama administration had assured Ankara “too confidently” about progress in the Minsk process. This is pointed out in order to justify the “slowing down” and anger in Ankara. It is understandable in a sense that the American party had to be much more meticulous and cautious on that point.

But, certainly, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan went too far when he made a conditional linkage between the ratification of the protocols and a “solution” in Karabakh last fall. This was a poisonous injection into the sensitive state of rapprochement; it paved way for the disillusionment of the parties involved and automatically increased the role played by Russia, bringing Moscow’s asymmetric influence into the picture.

This should also explain the increasingly negative reactions of the Azerbaijanis; it cannot merely be blamed on the flawed Turkish management on the Ankara-Baku side of the process. One has reason to suspect that internal Turkish circles menacingly working against the Justice and Development Party (AKP) may have jumped on the opportunity to make the Baku aspect instrumental in order to undermine the international credibility of the Erdoğan government. And it is well known that Russia exerts great influence over President Ilham Aliyev’s administration in the corridors of power in the Azerbaijani capital, where “men of Moscow” bear enormous weight.

Ankara, as well as the US, may have taken too much for granted with regard to Vladimir Putin and therefore the Minsk process needs to be handled much more carefully. The more Russia gets a free hand, rather than being convinced on the merits of a joint effort, the more complicated and helpless the process will be.

Another crucial question needs to be addressed. It is whether Erdoğan wholeheartedly believes in this process. The behavior which he has exhibited so far has raised enough suspicion. He has now virtually owned up to it. The contrast in the remarks and acts between President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan has been obvious. Has Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu done enough to help the process? This is another question, but overall, it indicates that it has been left to a confused and (domestically) concerned Turkish management to take the process further.

This leaves us with Yerevan. It is clear that Armenia did not have much leverage to help the process, but if the administration of Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan had pulled out from at least one occupied “rayon” last fall, it would have encouraged Erdoğan to change course and take positive steps. Still, the ball is in the Armenian court (particularly with regard to the fact that Ankara is now stuck with its position), which can go further with a symbolic pullout and play its cards aggressively.

If nothing else, “constructive ambiguity” must have taught the parties that not all of them can emerge as winners. This does not mean, either, that there will have to be any losers. Only the Russians can solve this Gordian Knot.