Turkey is no exception. The discussions held during the İzmir Economy Congress of 1923, the principle of statism implemented in 1929, the statist policies as well as the import substitution-based industrial policies all are the result of similar thinking. In the face of increasing heat from neo-liberal policies and the pressure of globalization, these attitudes and policies had to largely be abandoned, which eventually weakened the state. Almost of all of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) were either dissolved or privatized. Now, the state cannot fulfill its functions sufficiently; the health organization does not function properly; there are big and pressing issues in the field of education; unemployment is on the rise; and there is a major injustice in income distribution. Thus, the national state cannot keep its promises as it did in the past. This, in turn, prompts social groups who feel excluded or victimized to engage in various quests.In addition, there are other factors unique to Turkey such as the European Union membership process. The process is dissolving the administrative and legal structures. Notwithstanding strong objections from certain bureaucratic forces, Turkey is obliged to undertake reforms and change its legal system as prerequisites of this process. Globalization on the one hand and the EU process on the other as well as the failure by the state to fulfill its social functions lead to disintegration. Social reflexes that spring to life in the face of these developments tend to express themselves in nationalism as an ideology. Islamists have given up resistance and opted for assuming government office with a conservative/democratic identity, and this has given rise to an increased emphasis on nationalism by other groups.
Why do the social groups who regard themselves as opponents choose nationalism as an ideology to convey or mediate their responses? This is an important question: It should not be forgotten that Turkish nationalism first emerged in history as a defensive tool. Its founders had been forced to withdraw to Anatolia, where they tried to fortify their defenses against the West.
All these factors have led to the development of a psychology of fear. The fear of Turkey’s fragmentation and in particular the US invasion of Iraq and the fact that Iraq is a close neighbor of Turkey further boosted this psychology. The people of Iraq are Muslim, and a Muslim will be worried about things that happen to other Muslims. Second, Turkey is a country with an imperial heritage. Everyone living in this country has roots in the Balkans, the Caucasus or the Middle East, and vice versa. Therefore, Turkey cannot see itself different from Iraq, Palestine, Chechnya, Bosnia or Albania.
Moreover, there is also the underlying idea in people’s minds: “We have ruled these lands for 600 years, and we will rule again some day. We temporarily handed over, or were forced to hand over, these territories to Westerners.” The US came to this geography as a superpower and settled there, occupying lands and killing insurgents and civilians, and this causes a big swell of anger.
And we tend to describe all this as a rise in nationalist ideology. But the truth is different. Even though their medium of expressing themselves is nationalism, their intentions or orientations are completely different. We should not be misled by upheavals in appearance.
From a perspective that focuses on appearance, we observe the rising nationalist ideologies in Turkey and around the world, but when we look at the deep structure, we can detect that social and political upheavals are motivated by different factors. In the future, nationalist ideologies will only have false or fake roles. There will be other doctrines that will seize the initiative through conflict.
