Discussing Ergenekon -- and ‘the state within’

Jenkins was fiercely on the defensive, rejecting every criticism on what many saw as flaws, factual errors and misinterpretations in the report. Going through his text, he repeated his main thesis: that no such organization as Ergenekon exists. He devoted some considerable time to underlining the importance of “paranoia” and “conspiratorial reasoning” as main elements, which he implied affected the prosecutors in their work. There was practically no substantive evidence to make the case at all and just because he had to defend his position, he was “under assault” from some parts of the media, mainly Taraf and Zaman.

This displays an “over the top” sensitivity on his part, because he would have known that reaching such categorical and debatable conclusions as he did, he should have been counting on severe criticism, sometimes mixed with mockery and deep skepticism interspersed with counter-conclusions, but it is highly arguable that he was being “attacked.” Harsh criticism and attack are two different things.

Nevertheless, Jenkins has commendably helped provoke critical thinking even among those who disagree with him, and it was visible at the meeting. His opponents, Yıldıray Oğur and Emre Uslu (both of Taraf), fairly agreed with him on the parts of the report recapitulating the past of Turkish “deep state” formations, resembling much of Gladio. But, as Oğur suggested, the obvious “disconnect” (possibly deliberate) in the report is between the “deep state” structures and activities and the Ergenekon network, whose start date is 1999. Oğur also argued that disregarding continuity in the periods before 2000 and after is a deep flaw of judgment in the report.

Uslu, although agreeing to the criticism of some of the legal procedures carried out by the prosecutors, virtually lectured Jenkins on how the struggle against organized crime in Turkey had changed shape in recent years and that Jenkins was, while desperately seeking to prove Ergenekon “nonexistent,” ignoring the individuals pointed out in the context of the trial and ongoing investigation.

My dissent against Jenkins was the following: As long as the report was about the partially flawed legal methodology of the prosecution, it would be seen as a fair and impartial contribution. But, as is known, considerable parts of the report and its conclusions are deeply colored by the presumption and ungrounded claims that a conspiracy is taking place against the army and individuals by Islamists. I told Jenkins that as soon as the report entered this territory, imagining a conspiracy by what he calls Islamists, he immediately becomes part of further conspiracy theories, falling into the trap he is trying so hard to expose. Worse, this is the part that has created confusion abroad and contributed to polarization and partisanship around the case. That is the reason why it has lost much of its credibility as a source of reference.

About the criticism on the excessive use of wiretapping and long-term detainments, I advised Jenkins to study a subject he obviously had little knowledge of; namely the mafia trials in the US, in particular the so-called “Mafia Commission” case, in which the excessive use of bugs and wiretapping -- among other evidence -- defined the course of the trial, leading to verdicts. I reminded him of another objective fact: There was no agreed, universal norm on the length of time of detainments.

Regarding Jenkins’ claims that most of the 194 people are held unjustly in jail and his constant criticism of the prosecutors, I argued that it was not the prosecutors but the judges -- around 40 in number and randomly chosen – in the Beşiktaş district court, deciding upon evidence whether to detain or release suspects. I raised the point that Jenkins was criticizing the entire judiciary to the point of implying that they would have all been “politicized” by the powers, an absurd conclusion.