What is commonly referred to as the Red Book is in fact the National Security Policy Document (MGSB). This secret document was referred to as the “hidden constitution” and was deemed to have more power and priority over all other legal documents.Despite the written introduction stating that the MGSB was put together by the Cabinet and duties thereof were dispensed by the same authority, the reality was different. It was prepared by the mutual work of the Office of the Chief of General Staff and the National Security Council (MGK) and forwarded to the prime minister to be endorsed. The prime minister secured the signatures of the Cabinet members and could not change a word in the document. This procedure did not change in the long decades during which the MGK was composed of five generals, namely the chief of General Staff and four force commanders on one side, and five civilian Cabinet ministers headed by the prime minister on the other. The president of the republic was the natural head of the council who often happened to be a retired general or admiral. So the balance of the council generally tilted toward the members of the military and their mentality.
The decisions reached by the council had a direct affect on the Cabinet, which was obliged to carry them out. Security came above and beyond all else and everything related to security was ingrained in the document. However, the document lacked the distinction between security and defense. The armed forces could take on the defense side of security issues ranging from environment to employment and fighting against poverty and regional inequality. But this never happened.
Only after the electoral victory of the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) did the structure of the MGK change in favor of the civilian members. Furthermore, it was transformed into an advisory body rather than an executive organ above the government with a mandate on every issue that was thought to be associated with security.
The little Red Book is a secret statement written by the military establishment in the name of the state to safeguard the nation from its internal and external enemies. The monopoly on defining the “enemy” belonged solely to the “authors.” Among the external enemies, one could see most of Turkey’s neighbors and global currents that could not be toppled by military means. However, what made the document a security liability for the country was more how the “internal enemy” was defined. Certain ethnic groups, certain religious groups, certain political currents that have never been associated with violence or institutions such as the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in İstanbul, and so on, were labeled as “internal sources of threat” and were kept under constant surveillance and pressure.
It is ironic that in a country in which the most repeated words in political rhetoric are unity, brotherhood, equality and cultural richness what is professed and what is implemented are in stark contrast with each other.
Another confounding and dangerous issue is the duties given to the MGK by the MGSB. For example, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) has taken over the protection of the regime, and suppressing religious movements is particularly highlighted as one of the top security threats. “İrtica” or obscurantism is the most dreaded near and present danger that has taken top priority in every copy (revised every five years) of the MGSB for decades. However, no such serious movement has challenged the regime so far. Given the latest interrogations within the army concerning coup plans, evidence reveals that in the absence of concrete facts concerning obscurantism, some officers have tried to create missing facts. They have thought of planting weapons, bombing the premises of religious communities and have planned assassinations against non-Muslim community leaders in order to provoke public opinion within and without against religious groups and the incumbent AKP government.
I will further pursue this issue in the next article.
