It would, of course, be better for them to go as soon as possible of their own volition, and this would ease the strain they cause on Turkish social, political and economic life. Their failure to run the economy efficiently and make use of human and social capital properly because of their repressive and discriminatory rule notwithstanding, the mere possibility of a coup taking place in the country costs the country billions of dollars as the country’s risk premium increases, causing us to have to pay higher interest rates in addition to insurance premiums. These benefits are in the short run preferable, but if we consider the long run, I believe Turkey will become more just, because the bureaucratic oligarchy does not want to leave aside its undemocratic rule. Let me try to explain.Comparative politics has been busy with the question of how the nature of an outgoing authoritarian regime affects the advent of a new democracy, and this question continues to be a matter of controversy among political scientists. Some political scientists argue that in countries which experience repressive and discredited authoritarian regimes, civilians and social and political actors better appreciate the virtues of democracy. Turkish political scientist Tanel Demirel showed in his work on Turkish military regimes that the military interludes in Turkey (1960-61, 1971-73, 1980-83) have hardly been seen by a significant number of civilians as highly repressive. He also says they have not been conceived as failures in political, economic or military terms, gross human rights violations, state-sponsored terror and fear and insecurity under military rule that might result in changes in attitude that favor democracy. Those who criticize the democratic regime for its slow decision-making process, or for failing to improve socioeconomic inequalities, for instance, might better understand the difference between military rule and democracy in terms of the protection of basic human rights. Similarly, disappointments caused by the military regimes in the economic and/or military spheres could shatter myths about the effectiveness of military rule or authoritarian decision-making processes.
It is my contention that the public perception of the military regimes in Turkey is changing thanks to recent heated debates around the Ergenekon case. There are now several soap operas on almost every TV station questioning the Ergenekon affair, the 1980 coup and so on.
Several movies on the terror the military regime created after the 1980 coup have been watched by millions. Moreover, unlike the 1960, 1971 and 1980 coups, the Feb. 28, 1997 postmodern military intervention is now seen by many as undemocratic, unjust, repressive and highly discriminatory.
The financial crises that cost the country $50 billion that were caused by the great friends and businessmen who admired the military coup and who made sure to have four-star generals on their board also severely discredited the military coups and the intervention in the country.
Lastly, what is happening today is that as long as the bureaucratic oligarchy refuses to hand over its undemocratic rule to democratic mechanisms, every day democratic forces (some of them exist even in the army) will continue to expose the past bloody acts and future plans of the bureaucratic oligarchy. Just because the bureaucratic oligarchy does not want to leave peacefully, every day Turkey discuses if the pre-1980 terror was a work of the bureaucratic oligarchy in addition to left-right terrorism, Sunni-Alevi clashes and recent murders of secularist, Armenian or what have you public opinion leaders.
As a result, thanks to the bureaucratic oligarchy’s refusal to begin a mass exodus from crucial positions within the state and society, people are becoming more convinced that the authoritarian military tutelary rule has been the cause of the memories of insecurity, fear, exclusion and economic or political catastrophe. Developments that took place in Turkey last week showed that the army has woken up to this fact.
