The subject of the fourth meeting was, naturally, both civilian-military relations and the declared referendum process. Gül is now strongly engaged in a kind of institutional diplomacy to calm down the nerves and create hope for a common understanding for reform. His job is very tough and not very promising.What to predict and expect from the referendum process? Is the Justice and Development Party (AKP) determined to take it to the very end? What is at stake?
Agreed, the picture is blurry and the patterns rather complicated. Generally speaking, the AKP government now stands as responsible for all the moves and steps announced in various directions last year. The so-called “democratic” (Kurdish) initiative, repeated pledges to Alevis and non-Muslim minorities, the so-called normalization process with Armenia and judicial reform as well as constitutional changes -- they all sounded exciting. But now, after some obvious reconsiderations and political maneuvering, they all put the party to a test of confidence. Results expected still seem remote in all of them, even with the seemingly “easiest” one: rapprochement with Armenia.
In other words, the delay, not to say the failure, to turn pledges into action paves the way for doubts on sincerity and disappointment in the efficiency of a delivery despite a powerful single majority.
The smooth approval in Parliament of a change in law the other night, reducing the waiting period after putting an issue to a referendum from 120 days to 60, may show that the strength is there to be seen, but it is still too early to judge the change as an act of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s full determination to take constitutional amendments all the way to the people’s vote. He knows that the process itself will be an uphill battle, so his primary intention is apparently to test the political and social ground for whether it is wise to do so. The possibility of the AK Party fully stopping its intentions is also rather strong.
Baykal’s meeting with Gül confirmed further where the CHP would stand at this critical time. Baykal’s strategy remains -- and will remain -- unchanged: He is certain that the more paralyzed the AKP is, the better the likelihood that the next Parliament will force it to enter into a coalition or, better still for him, push it into the opposition. He will also remain cynically optimistic about a possible successful closure case against his adversary. To expect Baykal’s CHP to be part of a sensible, sound, consensus-seeking arrangement is equal to being naive under the circumstances.
Erdoğan quickly found out what he was seeking in terms of a roadmap: The CHP’s legal experts already announced that the change shortening the wait prior to going to a referendum to 60 days will enter into effect at the earliest next year due to some interpretations they made on the Elections Law. This declaration means that the warfare between the AKP and the CHP on legal grounds -- through the Constitutional Court -- will continue. The CHP will turn to the top court and this may very well be another case of backlash against the government.
The MHP’s defiant stance leaves no doubts, and the recent demands by the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) on lowering the threshold of elections (a very tough condition for the AKP) means that Erdoğan has a walk on the knife’s edge to a referendum. His strategy will most probably be to continue to test the pulse, force his hands to honestly reach out to the entire opposition in order to in the end cunningly declare defeat because the opposition will not play the civilized game. This, he will hope, will help raise sympathy for the “victim.”
In addition, Constitutional Court Chairman Haşim Kılıç recently told the press that “full consensus” is necessary for constitutional amendments and this might be helpful in this strategy. (Kılıç feared that a referendum pushed merely by the AKP deputies’ vote in Parliament would mean that his court would again be confronted with objections from the opposition.) Erdoğan would be expected to make use of that, focusing on the consensus and urgency of major matters in Turkey, hoping to corner -- and weaken -- the opposition.
So, one should expect a rough debate in the coming two months on this issue. Meanwhile, the question of confidence will be gaining even more urgency, if one takes into consideration the Armenian border issue externally and the Kurdish initiative part internally. Erdoğan has so far proven that he is a strong survivor; but this will be a year when this characteristic of his will be pushed to its limits.
