When the prosecution of the “Sledgehammer” conspiracy is considered together with the judicial investigation and trial against those involved in the “Ergenekon” conspiracy going on since 2008, one may conclude that military coup plotters will no longer escape prosecution and go unpunished. And this surely constitutes a momentous step in the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.It is possible to divide Turkey’s republican history into three main periods. The first period that roughly extends from the founding of the republic in 1923 until 1950 corresponds to the era of “top-down modernization” efforts under an authoritarian single-party regime. The second period, which begins with the introduction of multi-party politics in 1950 and spans over the rest of the 20th century, is the era of “top-down democratization” under the tutelage of the state elites and mainly the military, which overthrew elected governments on four occasions in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997.
The period that began with the start of Turkey’s European Union accession process in 1999 may be said to have set the stage for the “bottom-up democratization” of the regime led by the liberalizing and democratizing reforms of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which came to power in the elections of 2002. This period will be concluded when Turkey consolidates democracy as defined by the EU’s Copenhagen political criteria, that is, when it fully achieves “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities.”
The process of consolidation of democracy is expected to be neither smooth nor painless. The beneficiaries of the “old regime” are not likely to give up their privileges without a fight, as demonstrated by the military and judiciary coup attempts the country has been living through since the AKP came to power. The beneficiaries of the “old regime,” including the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), who cling to a highly authoritarian concept of secularism, first claimed that the AKP government had a hidden agenda to turn Turkey into a theo-democracy like Iran. They have recently revised their arguments against the AKP government and accuse it of being intent on establishing an authoritarian regime on the Russian, Vladimir Putin model. Their arguments, however, turn reality upside down and are merely excuses to defend the status quo. The “new regime,” a democracy in line with European norms, is likely to emerge mainly due to the following factors.
First of all, the vast majority of people, surely including even those who vote for opposition parties, do not want a country run by the military and favor democratic solutions to problems the country faces. In Parliament, parties who are opposed to the status quo are in the strong majority. Among intellectuals and the intelligentsia, those who assume a pro-democracy stance dominate, if not in numbers then with respect to the credibility of their discourse. The proponents of the old regime no longer prevail in the media as they did until the late 1990s.
In the military ranks, commitment to the old regime is quickly waning. The ranks of those who tend to think that its political role is damaging the military professionally and tarnishing its image and who want it to mind its own business are broadening. It is apparently they who leak the coup plots to the media and discreetly support the prosecution of the conspirators. Turkey now has prosecutors and judges who are committed to the rule of law rather than the old regime.
Throughout the Cold War, Western allies did not care much about the nature of the regime in Turkey as long as those in charge were committed to NATO. The US in particular, which preferred to deal with the military rather than elected governments, failed to object to military takeovers in Turkey, if not actively encouraging them. This is no longer the case. The Obama administration is well aware of the importance of democratic stability in Turkey for the Western alliance and for the US and is even spending time to persuade those European leaders who do not seem to be aware. Support for Turkey’s democratization and accession to the EU also prevails among the European political, business and intellectual elites. During the last week, spokesmen for both Washington and Brussels expressed clear support for the judicial process against coup plotters in Turkey.
Is the AKP government providing sound leadership for the transition from the old to the new regime? There is a lot to criticize. Is the judicial process against the coup plotters pursued fairly and entirely in accordance with the requirements of the rule of law? There is a lot to object to. These issues constitute, however, secondary worries for those concerned about the consolidation of liberty and democracy in Turkey.
