There are technicalities in the Erzincan incident, most of which have already been explained, and there is a need for explanation at the macro level. On the technical side, the suspicions of rogue elements within the army loom. For some time, two prosecutors, one in Erzincan and one in Erzurum, the latter equipped with higher judicial authority, were active on two seemingly separate files. The former was investigating two religious sects, based on some allegations of “reactionary activity.” The latter launched an inquiry, at a slightly later stage, on “subversive activity against the constitutional order” against a group of high-ranking military figures in Erzincan, including the commander of the 3rd Army, the local commander of the gendarmerie -- and the very prosecutor who had been investigating the two sects. The latter put the former on trial, and he (the prosecutor in Erzincan) was detained by a court in Erzurum. The very detainment was apparently based on ammunition and weaponry found in the region and a set of secret testimonies.A prosecutor investigating a colleague in such an explosive case is very unusual. It was conducted under the Law of Criminal Procedures, and respected lawyers all agree that the case was handled correctly by the prosecutor in Erzurum, Osman Şanal. But the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) disagreed. In what can be seen as a breach of its authority, the HSYK removed a group of prosecutors in Erzurum from their duties and filed a criminal case against them.
In the wake of the decision by the HSYK, the frontlines became immediately clear. While the bulk of the high judiciary stood at the side of the HSYK, and the leader of the main opposition with them, the government realized, if it had not already, that in order to be able to go further it urgently had to reform the judiciary.
There should be no doubt from the outset that what the government and Parliament face is yet another judicial coup of a powerful magnitude. The infamous Şemdinli case ended in limbo, with the HSYK barring its prosecutor, Ferhat Sarıkaya, from all professional activity, just because he had demanded that former Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt also be subjected to interrogation on the bombing of a bookshop in Hakkari. There is a very strong reason to believe that Şanal, the prosecutor in Erzurum, faces the same fate just because he insists on calling Gen. Saldıray Berk, commander of the 3rd Army, to testify on plotting an uprising and on links to the Ergenekon network. Berk refused to show up, and he was given a final ultimatum, with Feb. 26 as the deadline for him to testify before being brought to court by force. There is also suspicion that the commander and prosecutor acted together in placing the blame on religious sects by planting “evidence” of subversive activities.
But, let us leave the chain of events, as they appear only on the surface. What we have been witnessing is a remarkable breaking point which will have to push the government to a point of no return -- politically speaking. The prime minister and his team know, obviously, that the judiciary -- a consistent stumbling block before reform -- is not only displaying an act of self-defense, but has now exposed itself as the staunch defender of the system of tutelage based on an alliance between itself and the military. The government realizes that unless this bloc is confronted through democratic means, it will firmly prepare the ground for the collapse of Justice and Development Party (AK Party) rule. It has more or less paralyzed political progress on major, crucial matters and shows a capability of greater damage: The statement by the chief prosecutor the other day hints strongly at a new closure case against the AK Party, with the events in Erzincan as a pretext.
In a sense, the government has hit a wall: It will have to prepare and announce a constitutional reform package, with the judiciary on the top of the agenda. It has no alternative but referendum, and that too, may backfire, simply because the Constitutional Court is part of the “alliance for tutelage.” We shall have to assume that it will, and that will bring Turkey closer to a new election, and nobody can predict what sort of future that promises.
