Most Alevis regard themselves as a sect within Islam, while a minority regards Alevism as an altogether separate religion. The precise number of Alevis, who form the largest religious minority in Turkey, is not known since official censuses have omitted questions about religious identity, fearing this would reveal the religious diversity of the country. Scholarly estimates, however, maintain that Alevis constitute about 15 percent of Turkey’s population, which is close to 73 million, the vast majority of whom are Sunni Muslims, and that about a fifth of Alevis are Kurds. For those who are interested in learning about the Alevis, I highly recommend that they begin by reading Dr. David Shankland’s book, “Alevis in Turkey.”In Ottoman Turkey, considered a potential fifth column for the shahs of Shia Iran, Alevis were persecuted, especially in the 16th century when the Ottoman sultan assumed the title of caliph, the religious leader of the Sunni Muslims. This was the main reason why most Alevis welcomed the founding of the secular republic as a guarantee against Sunni dominance and why the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, has been accorded the status of almost a sacred figure by most Alevis. The homogenizing cultural policies of the republic have, however, denied the existence of Alevis and treated them as if they were Sunnis, building mosques in their villages that they had no need for and even obliging them, since the 1980s, to attend compulsory religion courses at school that teach Sunni Islam.
Alevis began to raise their voices against the official policies and demand official recognition of their religious identity only after the end of the Cold War. It was only in the 1990s that the Alevis were allowed by the authorities to build their religious houses of worship, called cemevis, in urban centers. The gradual recognition of Alevi identity in practice, if not officially, was also a policy pursued by hard-line secularist state authorities, who considered Alevis a balancing force against the rising tide of Islamism based among the Sunni majority.
Recent months have witnessed initiatives by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government not only towards official recognition of Kurdish identity, but also of Alevi identity. The AKP, which is regarded by hard-line secularists and their international allies as an “Islamist” party intent on transforming Turkey into a theo-democracy on the Iranian model, may in fact be moving Turkey towards a truly secular regime, where not only are the laws secular, but there is religious freedom for all. If the AKP succeeds in its current Alevi initiative, it may not only prove to be the true secularist party, but also begin to gain votes from the Alevi masses who, since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1950, have provided the bulk of the votes of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).
The state ministry responsible for religious affairs has organized a total of seven workshops that took place between June 2009 and January 2010 where government officials listened to the representatives of, if not all, most Alevi communities with a view to reaching consensus as to what needs to be done to meet their demands. Last week, the ministry published its preliminary report on the workshops.
If Turkey is to ever become a properly and not merely legally secular state, it is necessary that the current regime, which puts religion under state monopoly and curbs religious freedoms, is replaced by one that recognizes the religious diversity of the population, separates state and religion and secures freedom of conscience for all, including non-believers. That is going to be a very hard task, considering the constitutional, legal and cultural obstacles that stand in the way of realization of such a vision.
Suggestions in the preliminary report are far from sharing that liberal vision. Certain issues have, however, been raised during the workshops that point towards it. One suggestion is that in a mid to long-term perspective the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which currently controls all religious activity for Muslims, will cease to be a state institution and become an autonomous one that serves only the Sunni majority. Another suggestion is that religious services no longer be financed from the state budget, but by an optional religion tax.
Suggestions whose implementation seems to be possible in the short term boil down to three: that all legal provisions which discriminate against the Alevis are eliminated, that cemevis are accorded such status as to enable them to share privileges enjoyed by other houses of worship and that religion courses in elementary and secondary schools are made optional, in line with the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, which has found compulsory courses to be in violation of its convention. Even such meager steps would surely constitute a significant move towards the official recognition of Alevism and liberalization of Turkish-style secularism.
