The National Security Policy Document (MGSB), regarded as Turkey’s secret constitution, contains a list of who is perceived to be an internal and external threat and was written by the Turkish military after it received feedback from various institutions. The core problem of this document stems from the fact that appointed military bureaucrats and not elected civil authorities have been deciding what the nation’s security policies are. Paradoxically, political authorities are held accountable for failures and not the military for following guidelines set in the MGSB even though the military bureaucracy is the main author of this document.
Addressing the media on a TV program recently, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that when he first read the document after taking office, he found its content horrifying. Some changes were made to the document in 2005, he said, adding that the document is reviewed once every five years and will be rewritten this year.
Having seen previous MGSB documents before they were rewritten, I can say they do not befit a nation striving to instill democratic principles. External threat perceptions and strategies to be followed as set in the document recalled a Cold War mentality while internal threats included not only the ruling authority but almost all segments of society.
During revisions made in 2005, some parts of the internal threat section were changed and practicing Muslims were separated from extreme fundamentalist Islamic groups. Emphasis was put on the Turkish determination to become a member of the European Union. The revised document was also shortened to about 25 pages instead of the previous 200 or more.
The government has announced it will assert full control by writing a new document sometime this year, with economic grievances said to take priority.
In the meantime, the functions of the National Security Council (MGK) General Secretariat, where MGSB information is compiled once all views are collected from relevant institutions, have gradually lost their importance. The secretariat functions as an institution that produces national security policies for the government. Ironically, this process started in parallel to the civilianization of the MGK in 2003, when the relevant law was changed. This decline of MGK functions runs contrary to existing laws and relevant articles in the Constitution that empower the MGK with duties to set a road map for political authorities to design the country’s national security policies.
The MGK can, however, offer vast opportunities to political authorities to design long-term strategies for the threats of the 21st century, such as climate change, energy scarcity, food shortages and asymmetric threats.
With a change in the MGK law in 2003, the institution’s activities and decisions, providing the legal grounds for the influential role the Turkish military plays in political life, were reduced to the level of recommendations to the Cabinet.
The appointment of a new secretary-general to the MGK, Serdar Kılıç, Turkey’s former ambassador to Lebanon, early this month raised hopes that the institution will regain its previous functions. Kılıç gave this message to his staff.
Taking into account the fact that the civilian authority rewriting the MGSB by did not prevent juntas within the military from preparing coup plots to unseat the government, more radical reforms are required to ensure civilian democratic oversight of the politically powerful Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).
Such radical reforms will be possible once the existing Constitution, dictated by the military following the 1980 coup, is replaced by a new one.
