The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in power has not only been responsible for most of the constitutional and legal amendments required for accession to the European Union, but has even assigned, in the days prior to the last general election in 2007, a group of liberal-minded lawyers to draft a constitution in line with EU norms. It had, however, to shelve the idea soon after the election, despite garnering nearly half of the votes. It is currently flirting with the idea of partial constitutional reform towards broader democratic rights, but is uncertain whether it can achieve that.Why then has the AK Party government had to shelve the idea of a new constitution, is currently talking about only partial constitutional reform, and may even fail to pass it? The answer to these questions lies in the current balance of political forces. The country is divided between those forces which want to preserve the status quo as defined by the existing Constitution, and those which demand democratic change. The former prevail among the state elites while the latter are in the government.
The proponents of the status quo include also the main opposition parties, that is, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which aspire to rule in a coalition following the next election. The “class” base of the status quo may be said to be the İstanbul bourgeoisie that rose to prominence mainly due to the state subsidies enjoyed during the years until the 1980s when Turkey pursued an import substitution industrialization strategy. The social base of the status quo is composed mainly of urban educated strata committed to Kemalism.
Proponents of democratic change, on the other hand, are composed of social segments that are weary of the status quo. These include mainly the devoutly religious Sunni Muslims, the Alevis, the Kurds, and the non-Muslims. None of these groups, however, speaks with one voice, and none is much concerned with the others’ grievances. The Sunni religious complain of restrictions on their religious rights, but do not object to those on others’ rights. Alevis demand official recognition of their religion, but otherwise strongly support hard-line state secularism. Kurds demand recognition of their identity, but are divided between those who regard the PKK as their representative, and those who do not. The demands of the tiny minority of non-Muslims hardly matter for the larger society.
The leading “class” base of the proponents of change may be said to be the business and professional elites of Anatolia who have risen to prominence thanks to the liberalization and globalization of the Turkish economy since the 1980s. And the toughest critics of the status quo are surely the liberal-minded intelligentsia who display considerable differences among themselves.
The above configuration of forces form the circumstances under which the AKP leadership is trying to consolidate governmental power, while implementing its vision of a democratic and affluent Turkey assuming the status of the leading power in its region. It is not an easy task. Some of the difficulties arise from the the party’s own ranks. AKP has retained power since 2002 thanks mainly to the votes of Turkey’s urban and rural poor who have seen their standards of living improve under this government. If the worsening of their living conditions, due to the global economic crisis, is not reversed, the AKP may lose the coming election to be held in 2011. Despite the fact that the AKP is a truly national party garnering votes from nearly all social strata and all regions of the country, its capacity for uniting the anti-status quo forces is limited. Among the party rank-and-file commitment to liberal democratic values is feeble, and Sunni-Turkish nationalism prevails. An important part of the leading cadre is inclined to reconcile with the status quo to continue to enjoy the benefits of being in government.
Worse surely are the difficulties of the AKP that arise from its opponents. The AKP government took advantage of the EU accession process to amend the 1982 constitution to a considerable extent during its first three years in power. Under military and judicial coup threats, encouraged by the negative signals coming from the EU, it was soon forced to shelve the initiative for an entirely new constitution it put forward prior to the 2007 elections.
Considering there is no other way of winning the coming elections and putting in force its agenda, the AKP leadership is currently attempting at partial constitutional reform, to basically avert the threat of a second closure case before the constitutional court, and to affect some improvements in political rights even for the Kurds. It is possible, however, that the Constitutional Court, which has increasingly assumed juristocratic powers, will not allow for even a partial reform.
