The traditional and institutional militarist attitude of the CHP --whose political culture infused in its genetic code has its roots in the Committee of Progress and Union’s tradition of establishing illegal networks to meddle with politics -- is originally formulated as “Army + CHP = power.” True, I somewhat reversed this formula, but who can challenge the truth of this version? There is a famous Turkish saying: “It does not make any difference if you call someone ‘Bald Hasan’ or say ‘Hasan is bald’.” Both arrive at the same conclusion. In the “Army + CHP” formula, the stage just before the CHP would attain political power is a direct or indirect military intervention. For this reason, the formula “Army + CHP = power” does not hold if the formula “Army + CHP = military intervention” is ignored.Indeed, if we look at Turkish political history, we see that the political stance of the CHP, not only in the single-party era, but also after the multi-party regime was introduced in 1950, has always been in parallel to the that of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Though not to a great extent, the single relative deviation from this tradition occurred during the 1970s when later Bülent Ecevit became the head of the CHP. Actually, this explains how the CHP could become the first party after jettisoning militarism under the leadership of Ecevit. Perhaps because he had slightly distanced his party from the traditional militarism, Ecevit’s CHP had its share of the wrath of the military coup of Sept. 12, 1980. However, although he had realized even before 1980 the depth of the militarism infused in the CHP’s soul and its alienation from the nation, he could not completely clear this militarism. Ecevit had lost his hopes about this party, and when he made his appearance again in the political scene in 1980s, he and his family always avoided the CHP and its mentality, and established the Democratic Left Party (DSP), based on more populist rhetoric and principles. Despite insistence and pressure from the representatives of the CHP tradition, he never sought any merger with this party. I think Ecevit was one of those who knew best what a merger with the CHP would really mean. For him, uniting with the CHP meant nothing but collaborating with a militarist mentality. So, was Ecevit right or wrong in this determined attitude of his -- developed through his personal and profound experiences -- against the CHP and its mentality?
In my humble opinion, Ecevit was not wrong or did not make a mistake in developing such an attitude. What Ecevit saw in person as an insider and as the leader of the party, we witness every day as an outsider despite all those efforts by the CHP’s leading executives to polish and market the party. The republican era of Turkish political history consists largely of the overlapping of the army-CHP formula with reality. Of course, the “army” part of this equation does not correspond only to the TSK. The top judiciary and bureaucracy that always conceded to the tradition developed with the army and that categorically developed reflexes in line with that line should also be considered in the same pool.
Only during the time of Atatürk in the single-party period did the CHP attempt twice to introduce a tightly controlled multi-party regime, but immediately shelved these attempts under various pretexts. With pressure from the world, it was forced to allow the introduction of the multi-party system only after World War II, but they could never abandon their old habits. The military coup of May 27, 1960 was not only a military coup, but also the CHP’s coup. The military memorandum of March 12, 1971 was not only a military memorandum, but also the CHP’s memorandum. The CHP did not play a direct role in the militarist-despotic process that started on Feb. 28, 1997, but today’s CHP gives complete support to it. Today, it is virtually impossible to find a single CHP member to hurl a single-word criticism at the anti-democratic, unlawful and inhumane practices of the Feb. 28 process. Those who did were immediately banished from the CHP by Deniz Baykal. It actually did not take part in the Feb. 28 process, but it is easy to see the existence of the CHP in the mentality that pervades in the lines of the e-memorandum of April 27, 2007 and in every stage of the implementation of this memorandum.
The current leader of the CHP, which has such an unfortunate past, today claims that the military, or at least part of them, never meddle with politics. Making a statement the previous day after a meeting with the party members, he shamelessly maintains that “there is a coup demagogy” or a sort of “coup abuse” in Turkey as if numerous weapons and ammunition had not been found buried in various places around the country or as if the subversive plots of Ayışığı (Moonlight), Yakamoz (Sea Sparkle), Sarıkız (Blond Girl), Eldiven (Glove), Kafes (Cage) and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) had never been planned or dozens of active or retired military officers had not been detained or arrested in connection with these plots or hundreds of pages of indictments had not been prepared against them.
Here are Baykal’s exemplary words: “In Turkey, a military coup is not a reality, but the abuse of a coup. This should be put forward. In Turkey, there is a war waged against the state’s institutions, the judiciary, the TSK. ... There is no coup in Turkey, but a conspiracy. There is no coup, but an ambush...”
In the same speech, he further notes that many claims had been made, but none of them produced anything because the documents in question are “fake” and the claims are “false.” However, like any ordinary citizen, he knows that despite so many documents or evidence, all investigations or trials may be rendered ineffective or unproductive thanks to the militarist extensions within the judiciary or with pressure from the army or top judiciary or with impromptu arrangements in court. Moreover, prosecutors that conduct those investigations can be prevented from making any further progress at certain points, i.e., when there is the likelihood of those investigations reaching the upper ranks. As if it was not the CHP that had eagerly fought to ensure that the bill allowing military personnel to be tried in civilian courts be canceled by the Constitutional Court, and as if the army and the CHP and their supporters in the judiciary had not done their best to block judicial investigations, Baykal can suggest that the lack of progress in these investigations is the proof of the rightfulness of his military mentality.
Still, it is a reality that despite his 100 percent militarist attitude, Baykal is highly successful in presenting himself as “a democratic politician.” Despite his success, Baykal actually performs better in his original profession: advocacy. This is particularly so when he acts to defend the assailants in the Council of State attack, the murderers of the Christian missionaries, the masterminds of the Kafes action plan intending to kill non-Muslim minorities, the planners of the Sledgehammer plot, which aims to engage in cruel massacres, the mentality behind 17,000 mysterious murders in the Southeast and the assassins employed by that mentality, the Ergenekon terrorist organization’s architects of chaos and confusion and heinous massacres including the murder of Hrant Dink... Good job, Mr. Baykal, please go on with your coup advocacy!
