EU strategy for the South Caucasus

To many in the EU the South Caucasus is still seen as a jungle, with many different players vying for power and control over this geostrategically important region. The EU has always been quite reluctant to get too involved in a region which is seen as far from Brussels, laden with problems and closely guarded by Russia. The Kremlin has made no secret that it views this region as one that should remain close to Moscow, and that integration with the West should be at a level acceptable to Moscow. Armenia’s loyalty to Moscow is without question, Azerbaijan has played a careful balancing game and the Georgians went too fast too soon but at least woke the EU from its comatose policy. The Russia-Georgia war put the EU into the position of having to take the lead, which gave the EU a far more visible profile in the region through the deployment of the Monitoring Mission, the launch of a large post-war assistance program and a fact-finding mission which resulted in the Tagliavini report. Furthermore, the launch of the EU’s Eastern Partnership in 2008, which aims to strengthen ties between the six countries in the EU’s eastern neighborhood, offered an opportunity to help develop more robust political and economic relations providing the EU can muster the political will to keep the policy alive. However, it all seems to be done rather halfheartedly, and while the Georgians would like more from the EU in terms of security, the EU remains reluctant and seems more interested in looking for an exit strategy. It also seems happy to continue to let other regional powers, Turkey and Russia, take the lead in other regional initiatives. The EU prefers to sit in the back seat.

The Georgian conflict should have acted as a wake-up call as to why so-called “frozen conflicts” should not be left to smolder, but it did nothing to increase the EU’s interest in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which remains the most dangerous in the region, with the ceasefire being broken almost every day. While the EU’s special envoy for the region, Peter Semneby, does his best and is very active shuttling between Baku, Yerevan, etc., his mandate and funding is so limited he has been able to achieve very little during his time in office. Furthermore the EU does not have an evenhanded approach with respect to territorial integrity. While Brussels has been quite happy to condemn Russia for its occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it does not take the same approach vis-à-vis Karabakh, rather preferring to play a balancing act between Baku and Yerevan rather than dare to suggest that Armenia is doing something wrong and should kindly consider withdrawing from the Azerbaijani territories (around 17 percent of Azerbaijan) it continues to occupy. While Armenia may continue to argue that it holds on to these territories for the security of the Karabakh population, this situation should not be accepted by the international community forever. A new war cannot be ruled out and with military build-ups skyrocketing in both countries the EU needs to take a firm approach. The EU’s “political conditionality packages” have also not produced much in the way of concrete changes.

While Armenia has its vast diaspora to help it out in its relations with the EU, Azerbaijan has its best friend, too -- gas. EU officials admit that because of the EU’s desire to acquire Azerbaijani gas for projects such as Nabucco they have no leverage over Baku to carry out political reforms. But even here, on energy-related issues, the EU’s strategy is weak and more talk than action. Energy experts are starting to speculate that the EU is losing interest in Caspian gas. While the EU regularly cites Azerbaijan as a crucial partner for energy security and diversification issues, EU heads of state find it very hard to go to Baku. The EU should engage a special envoy for Caspian energy, which would be highly symbolic of the EU’s interest in the region and the priority it places on energy diversification and security issues.