Many people even connect recent “unusual” developments, i.e., the PKK attack in Tokat province, to Israel. Such expectations increased after a recent diplomatic crisis between the two countries. Even people like Doğu Ergil think Israel could retaliate by mingling with some of the destabilizing elements in Turkey.Given that the PKK has changed its objectives from being an organization engaged in a nationalist struggle to an organization that has been acting like a “gun for hire” in the region, it is possible that the PKK would seek some support from Israel and in return offer its services to Israeli interests. But this service would be limited because the PKK leadership has a skeptical outlook of the Israeli intelligence service and Israeli policies in the region. The question is, would Israel accept such a deal with the PKK?
In addition, it is a fact that, whether true or not, the majority of people in this part of the world believe Israel is somehow involved in the PKK affair, of course negatively. Most people relate the Israeli presence in northern Iraq with the idea that Israel supports the PKK. But Israeli companies and (former) security personal have been working in northern Iraq to train peshmerga forces, not PKK terrorists.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that Israel does not want to see the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in power. They would no doubt love to see the AK Party removed from power.
The three points mentioned above provide the perfect ground for nationalist intellectuals, and to some degree liberal intellectuals, to speculate about the possibility of cooperation between the PKK and Israel. Yet an in-depth examination of Israeli policy indicates that even if the PKK offers its services to Israel, Israel would not want to do business with the PKK. There are several reasons why Israel would not want to support the PKK or any other terrorist organization to destabilize Turkey.
First, Israel has itself been fighting against terrorism. In recent years, the main argument that Israeli policymakers developed against Iran is that Iran sponsors terrorist organizations. Knowing that Iran is looking for a way to tie Israel to terrorism, it is not logical for Israeli decision makers to consider supporting the PKK as a card against the ruling party in Turkey.
Second, Israel is very well aware of the fact that Turkish, Iranian, Syrian and many other intelligence agencies have penetrated the PKK structure. Therefore, any connection between the PKK and Israeli sources would easily be detected and documented by various intelligence agencies that have their eyes and ears inside the PKK. Such a connection would immediately be leaked to media outlets and turned into a protest campaign against Israel. It would thus be a grave mistake for Israel to attempt any such connection with the PKK.
What if Israel uses proxies -- i.e., Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani -- to communicate with and support the PKK? In fact, when a state decides to support a terrorist organization, it uses proxies so as to mask its name. Moreover, Israel is one of the states that are exceptionally talented when it comes to hiding their name if their intelligence agencies conduct an illegal operation.
Nevertheless, it is not logical for Israel to actively support the PKK because Israel knows how changeable the rules of the game in this part of the world are. There is no political actor that Israel can fully trust as a proxy in this region. Today’s proxies could turn into tomorrow’s enemies. Moreover, in the Middle East, it is not possible to hide a secret operation forever because there are many eyes and ears in critical locations, including northern Iraq. Thus, it is still too risky for Israel to use proxies to support the PKK.
Third, PKK leaders consider the Israeli intelligence service as one of the perpetrators of a “global conspiracy” against jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Öcalan and other PKK leaders think Mossad is one of the players responsible for Öcalan’s arrest. Therefore, it is not very easy for PKK leaders to fully trust Mossad and to do business with it. Yes, the PKK welcomes any support from the international community; however, even the PKK has its limits.
This does not mean Israeli diplomats and politicians cannot send messages sympathetic to Kurdish nationalists. In fact, they do send them and could continue to do so. However, this does not mean Israel supports the separatist terrorist movement in Turkey.
Despite the fact that Israeli politicians may want to see a different party in power in Ankara, at least these three reasons prevent it from contacting the PKK to destabilize Turkey. Furthermore, Israel does not need to work with terrorist organizations to destabilize Turkey. Many other elements are still at its disposal to pursue its interests in Turkey. In future columns, I will continue to analyze other elements that may serve Israeli interests in Turkey.
