It is hoped that the AKP government will not backtrack, and will continue to further liberalize the regime. Failure to address difficult problems in time surely results in their worsening. This is especially true for the Kurdish problem in Turkey. In the 1980s it was officially argued that “There is no Kurdish problem but a terrorism problem, and it can be solved by killing the terrorists.” Later the argument was, “Yes there is a Kurdish problem, but there can be no reforms before terrorism is defeated.” Then, when terrorism took a break for over five years following the capture in 1999 of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kurdish rebellion, only meager steps were taken to recognize Kurdish identity. The result was nothing but the growing influence of the PKK among Turkey’s Kurds.Now for the first time in republican history there is a government in charge which has declared its determination to solve the Kurdish problem by consolidating liberal democracy. I am not sure about the skill and capacity of that government in achieving these goals. I am, however, convinced of the following: First of all, the government has true intentions, since there is no other way to fully place the military under civilian authority, to allocate resources not to weapons and war but to economic development and welfare, and to thus establish Turkey as a regional power on course to join the European Union. Secondly, the AKP’s performance in the parliamentary elections next year is highly dependent on the outcome of the Kurdish initiative. And thirdly, it is an extremely difficult endeavor.
These are more or less the current circumstances: Responsible minds within the military seem to have finally grasped that the PKK is the product of the Kurdish problem, that the Kurdish problem arises from the suppression of Kurdish identity and that unless Kurdish identity is recognized it will not be possible to bring an end to the PKK uprising. That is why the current chief of General Staff, Gen. İlker Başbuğ, is talking about recognition of Kurdish identity on the basis of “individual [not group] rights.” He is, in this context, also signaling that the military will not hinder if not actively provide support for the government initiative.
Başbuğ, who is to retire this summer, is however challenged with not a few elements within the military ranks involved in conspiracies to overthrow the government and stop its initiatives towards further democratization. The nationalist opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), have allied themselves against the government no matter which initiatives it takes and no matter what the consequences can be. There are apparently elements within the AKP ranks too, extending possibly even to the Cabinet, who disapprove of the Kurdish initiative.
The now-defunct pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) prioritized not giving support to the initiative but using it as an opportunity to force the government to negotiate with the imprisoned Öcalan. (Whether the Peace and Democracy Party [BDP] that has replaced it will pursue a similar policy remains to be seen.) And the PKK indicated by various provocations that it is not interested in the initiative if it is not negotiated with.
The government, however, is not isolated. Despite worsening economic conditions it continues to enjoy broad support both from the people and the intelligentsia. Support for the initiative comes from Turks and especially Kurds who are fed up with violence that has cost 40,000 lives and incalculable moral and material losses. Turkey’s allies, including the Obama-led US and most importantly the Iraqi Kurdish leadership, back the initiative. Neighboring countries are no longer involved in covert activity to destabilize Turkey, as most did during the 1990s.
The PKK rebellion cannot be dealt with mainly through security measures taken in coordination with allies and neighbors. Reforms must aim at nothing less than liberalizing all nonviolent views and lifting all hindrances to the free expression and enjoyment of Kurdish identity. It is necessary that pursuing Kurdish political demands through peaceful means is fully legalized. It is also necessary that an unconditional amnesty allows rank-and-file PKK militants an opportunity to return to normal lives, and engage in legal political activity if they so desire.
Unless such substantial reforms are step by step, without further delay, put in practice, Turkey may once more miss the opportunity to put an end to the domestic political violence that has cost so dearly. Turkey can solve the Kurdish problem, not only because Turks and Kurds are bound up with each other historically, culturally and through mixed marriages, but because vast majorities of both strongly favor the territorial integrity of the country. If Kurdish identity is not fully recognized, however, the problem is likely to grow.
