Since the very first day the subject of the initiative made it onto the national agenda, it has been apparent just who has adopted what sort of stance toward the initiative. There are those who have failed to “pass the exam” set by the initiative, those who are being “held back a year” or even just those who are spoilsports and who are thus refusing to play the game. These different groups are represented by Kemalists, nationalists and Kurdish politicians.Alright, so perhaps the opposition of the first two groups listed above is understandable due to their general aversion toward the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, but what is the reason for the objections to the democratic initiative by Kurdish politicians? Many have been rightly surprised by the level of objections to the initiative by Kurdish politicians. While the more western reaches of Turkey have risen up against the initiative based on feelings of: “Why are the Kurds being given more rights? There aren’t even any differences between us!” the outpouring of Kurdish political masses onto the streets to protest the initiative has surprised not only regular citizens but intellectuals as well.
One of those who has spoken most succinctly on this sense of surprise has been columnist Etyen Mahçupyan. And, in fact, he even started a debate over it. Referring to the street protests over the 17-centimeter-smaller prison cell for Abdullah Öcalan as well as the attack on the soldiers in Reşadiye in connection with the forced closure of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), Mahçupyan asserted that, in fact, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) real aim is neither to see a solution nor peace but to gain more power. He also noted that those who truly do wish to see both peace and justice in Turkey have now become a part of politics, which will ultimately make both peace and justice meaningless and impossible. Mahçupyan also boldly noted that while Kurdish citizens are greatly deserving of all the peace and justice in the world, Kurdish politics is currently not worthy of either of these things. He even went on to question whether or not, in light of the most recent developments, the Kurds might soon experience their own version of the Feb. 28 process. For my part, I believe that this actually dragged this debate into the arena it was meant to occupy. Because in many of the analyses we hear and read concerning the current situation in Turkey, Kurdish citizens and Kurdish politics are lumped together. In this way then, by separating the two concepts of Kurds as opposed to Kurdish politics, a more meaningful and healthy foundation can be created for interpreting the situation in the manner it deserves.
Those who are able to view the whole topic from a more independent perspective know this: If, in its various struggles for democracy, Kurdish politics has from time to time relied on certain democratic arguments, the fact is that by and large it has produced and created undemocratic mechanisms. The PKK has used violence not only in its struggle against the state but also against Kurdish politics itself. This in turn is connected to the changes being seen in the political foundations that have begun to bother the PKK. The fact that for many years neither Kurdish political circles nor the Turkish left, which sympathizes with the PKK, criticized this particular mechanism is in direct connection to the undemocratic nature of the mechanism itself. This being the case, Kurdish politics, leaning on just one idea and one voice, became a goal unto itself in its struggle against the state. But now, this whole foundation is about to change. The desired outcome of the democratic initiative is not to finish off the Kurdish problem in one day but to instead draw the arguments and debates into a democratic foundation. In other words, to turn this debate-filled arena into one in which meetings and compromises can be achieved.
It is precisely for these reasons then that this anti-democratic tendency in Kurdish politics, basically invisible until today, has now become a serious problem. Because after all, the movement of Kurdish problems to a more democratic foundation does not show that somehow Kurdish politics and politicians have, on their own, moved into a more democratic mentality. In fact, the likelihood that this will even happen is weak, as violence and the mechanisms that are created by violence will prevent it from happening. In other words, the mechanisms that are born out of the belief that violence is a political vehicle will block democratic politics from occurring on these foundations.
At this juncture, it is also important to consider this: That it has not only been the PKK base in Turkey that has turned these mechanisms into things not to be questioned, but it has also been the Turkish leftist intellectuals who have caused this to happen by lending legitimacy to these mechanisms.
The post-1980s Turkish left was a left hit hard by defeat, a left which believed strongly that anything against the state was “permitted.”
In this sense then, while Mahçupyan was right in his criticisms leveled at the undemocratic tendencies present in Kurdish politics, he should not have been thinking of Kurdish politics as being in a separate category from the Turkish left. Yes, it is true that there is not necessarily any overlap in the masses of people who support Kurdish politics as opposed to the Turkish left; still, we must not ignore the union of mentality between these two spheres. After all, the defining arguments that prop up the basic mechanisms in Kurdish politics are really the arguments of the Turkish left. And what the PKK really means is Kurdish problems wrapped on leftist arguments.
