Despite resistance from the military and the judiciary, Turkey maintains its democratic progress and wants to become a different regime, I argued. Although the DTP and its patron, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), could secure the emotional support of Kurds, they are moving away from Kurds’ conception of the future, I added. In other words, we were witnessing a break with the established political traditions in Kurdish groups. My reasoning continued as follows:“The current scene, along with the DTP’s closure, has the potential to create two results, one short term and one long term. In the short term, we can predict that it will increase distrust on the part of Kurds, decrease possibilities for their dialogue with the government and increase the PKK’s hegemonic influence on Kurdish society. But there’s no chance that this situation will last very long because, above all, Kurds are now overall a bit less partisan to the PKK, ideologically speaking. No matter how very difficult it is to oppose the organization politically, it’s also that difficult to approve of them ideologically.” The predictions of this paragraph were all confirmed in a week as if we were in a fast-moving film. First, the DTP deputies decided to resign as members of Parliament and said that there would be no turning back from this decision. Their choice was a sign of their opting for separatist and harsher policies and implied that the PKK would push the informal Kurdish parliament called the Democratic Society Congress, or in other words, they would support a structure that would create grounds for separatism. With this move, they would not only close the channels of communication with the government, but the PKK would also boost its hegemonic influence on Kurdish society.
Yet, as noted in the above-mention excerpt, this did not last long. Before long, things were reversed. The DTP members decided to remain as deputies affiliated with a newly established party and re-establish their parliamentary group. It was said that this change of heart was attributable to the demands voiced from the Kurdish voters and guidance from (PKK leader Abdullah) Öcalan. Then, something more surprising happened, and the notes of the meeting between Öcalan and his lawyers were leaked uncensored for the first time in many years. Öcalan stressed three points: First, he was able to discover the connection between the PKK and Ergenekon only later. Thus, the PKK leader confessed to the existence of such a connection. Second, he said he would never have approved the attack that killed seven soldiers in Tokat and he positioned himself away from the PKK. Third, he does not regard violence as a policy, but his attitude is nothing but the “democratic politics” method.
He obviously made these statements with a tactical purpose. Öcalan is trying to position himself above the PKK and act as a “referee” or as a “wise man.” Still, he openly supports democratic politics. The expected result of this attitude is that some hawkish figures within the DTP will not be executives of the newly established party.
Öcalan also said that the DTP deputies had decided to resign from Parliament without consulting him, but this does not sound convincing. Thus, we come back to the main question. These people, who seemed eager to close their doors to the external world and promote separatist policies and use violence as a method just a week ago, why have they opted to re-engage in parliamentary politics and dialogue? My previous article also contained a possible answer to this question.
“Ultimately, the DTP’s closure may lead to the birth of a confident Kurdish movement that will for the first time be able to distance itself from the PKK. [However] the PKK is probably also aware of this, and it will from day one want to take the new party under its strict control. But there’s a possibility -- and not a small possibility -- that this stance will increase the distance between wide segments of Kurds and the PKK, and lead towards alienation.” In short, the PKK was pinned against the wall: If it refrained from parliamentary politics, it would encourage the emergence of a new political party among Kurds. On the other hand, if it attempted to curb such a new political player, it would further alienate itself from Kurdish society. The solution was to return to Parliament and engage in politics dreamed of by Kurds.
In all these years, the PKK has not changed. The state’s attitude has made the PKK’s violence “acceptable” for Kurds. But now, both the state and the Kurds are changing. And this will change the PKK, too.
