If politics (capital P) is the consensual strategic roadmap of what ought to be done with what resources by whom, policies (lower case p) are practical and tactical moves for implementing those that are drawn up in the map. Given this description, Turkish politics (P) has generally been devoid of policies (p), rendering it abstract, arbitrary and fluid. Implementations with lasting effects are rare and devoid of force because they rarely rely on consensual backing from different segments of society and political parties. Considering that the present Constitution, admittedly a “Procrustean bed,” is a military-made one following the 1980 coup, it should be the first priority of all political parties to change it to a civilian and liberal one if these institutions are really instruments of democracy, as is written in the code that has given birth to them. Yet, in the constant bickering amongst them, parties miss the opportunity and at the end fall prey to the gravity of the status quo and its guardians. In the end the frame provided by the P hangs in the air blank or only sketchy because there are not enough p’s to fill it.The democratic initiative of the government is no different. The frame is there but there is no picture in it to grasp what it really is. Nevertheless, the opposition has not missed the opportunity to criticize the initiative at will without a definite argument except accusations of treason and dismembering the country along ethnic lines. The people are watching this horseplay with amazement and despair without understanding much and are being misled by the negative atmosphere created by the cheerleaders of the status quo.
To this funeral chorus there is a new addition, namely the notorious armed Kurdish organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has recently scuttled the initiative by executing an ominous terrorist attack on a non-combatant team of gendarmerie soldiers in Tokat last week. This attack is another example of how opposing poles can join forces to the same end: stopping change for the better because they will no longer exist. Indeed, in a democratic Turkey, where the politics of coercion is replaced by consensus and the politics of pluralism overwhelms the forces of uniformity, guardians of the bureaucratic republic will evaporate. But we are not there yet.
The second difficulty arises from the lack of a correct diagnosis of the problems that have heretofore been labeled merely as “deviation” or “subversion” by the ruling bureaucratic and political elite. The “Kurdish problem” is no different. Its full extent, historical reasons and present context have never been grasped, and policies to this end have not been devised. Now the Kurdish problem is no more an internal affair. With the bulk of the PKK militia in northern Iraq and sister organizations operating in Iran and Syria, the matter has been internationalized.
The incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party) had the wisdom and courage to take on the problem but started on the wrong foot. Rather than taking the Kurdish people of the country into account and referring to them as the legitimate party to cooperate with in order to solve the problem, it chose to cooperate with external actors. No major and protracted social conflict can be defused and subdued without involving the party that is part of the problem. In the Turkish case this basic dictum has been missed.
The parties that have been included in the “solution process” are the US (still the occupying power in Iraq), the KRG (Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq), Iran and Syria. Of course, this is a war alliance. It does not serve the purpose of the inclusion and integration of the Kurds into the system that has so far been unsuccessful in accommodating them. Now there is a challenge to tackle things before it is too late in terms of the spreading violence due to the banning of the only Kurdish political party in the Turkish Parliament. Will the real bearer or perpetrators of Kurdish dissidence and violent reaction be included, at least indirectly into any deal of peace making or not? Will the full extent of the Kurdish problem be acknowledged and the narrow approach of “disarming the terrorists in the mountains” be abandoned for a more comprehensive “opening”? If not, will the “opening” be closed before it comes to fruition? At what cost?
