However, two months on and the euphoria that surrounded this development has started to cool as reality has set in. It is becoming increasingly obvious that Armenia and Turkey are at odds over the process. Armenia has made it clear it will not ratify until Turkey does; Turkey has said it will not ratify until it has seen some tangible progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, while Armenia continues to state that the two issues are not linked. Furthermore, while Turkey says it has no timeframe or deadline for ratification, Yerevan sees the window of opportunity coming to a close by February or March of next year.The international community seems to support the position of Armenia -- that the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia is separate to the ongoing peace talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Azerbaijani province of Nagorno-Karabakh. (Karabakh and seven surrounding regions continue to be occupied by Armenia.) Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan, and close-knit ties between the two countries -- particularly within the old Kemalist establishment and the military -- make it difficult for Ankara to push ahead. Therefore, Turkey states that one is not possible without the other and that conflict resolution is part and parcel of the normalization process, which aims to bring increased stability and prosperity to the region. For its part, Baku is also playing its own energy card well, threatening to use alternative routes to export to the West or to sell all its gas elsewhere. Repeated promises made by Turkey’s leadership to the Azerbaijani nation would now make it almost impossible for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to backtrack. This approach was underlined by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan during his meeting with President Barack Obama last week in Washington. He made it very clear that unless Armenia withdraws from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (excluding Karabakh itself), Turkey will not be able to move forward with the ratification of the two protocols. Washington had been pushing Turkey to normalize relations quickly and unconditionally, but this now seems like a distant prospect even though it will mean Erdogan losing some credibility. It is unlikely that the US will be able to change Turkey’s mind given that Turkey is an increasingly crucial partner to the US on a whole array of issues -- not to mention that Washington will not want to further rock the boat with Azerbaijan, with Baku being an increasingly important partner on energy security issues.
Unfortunately, things now look rather bleak because, save for a complete change of policy from Yerevan, Armenia will not be withdrawing troops any time soon -- unless, of course, it is part of the “package deal” set of basic principles that is currently being negotiated with Azerbaijan and encompasses the relevant security guarantees for the Karabakh population. Turkey had clearly been hoping that increased international pressure on Yerevan and Baku would have resulted in a breakthrough. But so far no such breakthrough has occurred, and a solution could still be years rather than months away. Although the number of differences between the two leaders has further narrowed and an agreement is closer than at any point in history, there are still some sticking points, including the final status of Karabakh and how this will be defined. While it would seem highly unlikely that Karabakh will ever be part of Azerbaijan proper again, at the same time it is unlikely it can become an independent state. The world does not need another Kosovo.
It would be a terrible tragedy if this process of rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia was to come up against a brick wall because of Karabakh. Unfortunately, it would appear to be heading this way.
