The existence of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) Web sites was revealed in an e-mail sent by a military officer to a number of newspapers and journalists last week. The officer, who wished to remain anonymous, claimed that the armed forces established 42 Web sites as part of their psychological warfare against “dangerous” civilian groups, which were categorized as “reactionary,” “separatist,” “pro-Justice and Development Party [AK Party]” and “anti-TSK.”The armed forces also monitored the activities of more than 400 Turkish and foreign language Web sites. The plan against Web sites was devised at the Third Information Support Unit of the General Staff by a number of colonels and was allegedly coordinated by Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Hasan Iğsız, according to the officer. Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ was also reportedly informed about the plan.
The General Staff confirmed last week that it had set up Web sites to monitor groups upon a directive that it received in 2000 from the then coalition government headed by late Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. Turkish bureaucrats then denied the existence of such a regulation. Nevertheless, what is at stake is Turkey’s democracy. To improve Turkish democratic standards, it is a must for neither the TSK nor any other institutions to engage in undemocratic practices. To end such practices, the AK Party should cancel all existing covert or overt regulations intended to smear certain segments of society.
In addition to laws that regulate the activities of the TSK and the Gendarmerie General Command (JGK), which acts under the orders of the military though it is affiliated with the Interior Ministry, there have been hundreds of internal regulations issued within both organizations, some of which have an influence over laws.
For example, there are an estimated 500 laws and internal regulations issued by the JGK that define its responsibilities and duties. This security organization justifies its practice of smearing the society by effectively bypassing laws and simply issuing an internal memo.
The Security and Public Order Assistance Squads (EMASYA) secret protocol, for example, signed between the Interior Ministry of the related government in July 1997 and the JGK, stands as another important document that needs to be cancelled by the current government as it provides the military authority above that of the governor.
Through EMASYA, the military took over posts traditionally controlled by the police and governors. The gendarmerie moved from rural areas to urban ones.
Through EMASYA, a domestic security structure was established that posits society itself as being the greatest threat.
The European Union Progress Report released on Oct. 14 stated that the 1997 EMASYA secret protocol on security, public order and assistance units remains in force unchanged. The protocol allows military operations to be carried out for internal security matters under certain conditions without a request from civilian authorities, it said.
Still, the military has a great deal of influence in describing both internal threat perceptions and external threat perceptions in addition to gathering intelligence separately without coordination with other intelligence gathering organizations in the country. This is despite the fact that junta activities within the military to unseat the government have been disclosed while several retired generals as well as active officers are being tried over charges of fomenting an armed uprising to topple the civilian authority.
This reality itself poses one of the serious roadblocks before any effort to solve Turkey’s decades-long Kurdish question in particular and to widen democracy in general.
