On this issue Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is usually compared with Turgut Özal, who once dismissed a former chief of general staff who disagreed with him. A university professor recently reminded Erdoğan that Özal would discharge Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ if he was in the prime minister’s shoes. This observation received the strongest applause from groups Prime Minister Erdoğan represents.Although Erdoğan has not shown a reaction to the statement, current events help him realize, at least, that his supporters want him to dismiss Başbuğ from his post. Politically, such a move would be a big plus for Erdoğan for at least two reasons: First, Erdoğan would prove to his constituency that he is in charge of the government and that the military is not involved in civilian affairs. With such a step, he could prove he can show courage and convince his constituency that he is not far behind Özal when it comes to dealing with undemocratic TSK attempts. Second, he can prove to EU members that the civilian government is in control and that civil-military relations are normalizing. Third, as Turkish and foreign political observers note, the chief of general staff is expected to resign from his position in such situation. Even pro-TSK foreign observers think along these lines.
Yet in reality, Başbuğ would not voluntarily resign from his position because he thinks -- or at least wants us to believe -- that all these developments are not real; they are part of a conspiracy to weaken the TSK’s role in the Turkish state structure. Even if he acknowledges the wrongdoings of TSK officers, he and many other TSK supporters think such plans and operations were necessary to maintain the TSK’s unchangeable role in the Turkish state structure. As a result, he probably considers himself one of the few worriers of the secularist state structure and resigning from his post would equally mean betraying his supporters within and without the TSK.
Whatever the case, resignation means losing a battle for Başbuğ. In addition, the example of former Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt, who backed down from active opposition to the government after meeting with the prime minister at Dolmabahçe Palace, discredited Büyükanıt in the eyes of the traditional TSK supporter base: neo-nationalists. They disapproved of what Büyükanıt was doing. For Başbuğ, to at least not be in a similar position as Gen. Büyükanıt in the eyes of his supporters, the neo-nationalists, it would be politically logical to resist and, if possible, intensify his fight against the government during the final stage of its term. Thus, it is not likely that Başbuğ will consider resigning from his position. Instead, one can expect the conflict between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and the military to further deepen in the coming months.
For Erdoğan, it is also not possible to dismiss Başbuğ. Turkish and foreign observers speculate that when Ergenekon prosecutors detained retired generals a few months ago, Başbuğ went to Erdoğan and offered his resignation along with petitions from other commanders demanding to resign as well. Speculation abounds that such a collective action from the highest-ranking generals could no doubt put Erdoğan’s government in a politically difficult position.
To avoid such an action, Erdoğan has nothing but to find a way to work with Başbuğ and his colleagues. Furthermore, Turkish society has since 2004 been deeply divided into two camps -- so much so that the secularist segments of society cannot bear such an act by the government. Although they have very limited tools to use against the government, they at least still have power in the judiciary to fight against the government trough mobilizing secular prosecutors and judges against the government.
The question is, if Erdoğan’s government has its own limitation to take any action against the generals, could Başbuğ and his colleagues take further steps against the AKP and the Gülen movement to implement what was outlined in the leaked TSK files? Technically it is very difficult for the TSK to pursue such policies since its intentions against the AKP and the Gülen movement have become public; however, if the government fails miserably to implement its Kurdish initiative, it will lose its credibility in the eyes of the majority of the public. At such a time, the government and the Gülen movement will be prone to such attacks from the TSK and the secularist segment of society. In such a case, the secularists under the leadership of military generals will want to stone the AKP and the Gülen movement to death.
