It has become more visible than ever, with the latter's pursuit of a simple tête-à-tête to discuss pros and cons and the extent of the carefully initiated “Kurdish Process” with the former. To a rather blunt call by the prime minister, the leader of the main opposition chose to respond with a six-pages-long letter, in an apparent grandiose gesture aimed at the public, as it were, to impress upon it just how incredibly important he is.He could have just written a sentence saying, “Yes, whenever it is convenient, let us meet and talk.” Instead, Baykal's letter was leaked to the press, and the same old, well-known rhetoric -- including absolutely nothing new -- written in an asymmetrically patronizing tone, has filled the pages. Some pundits called it a typical act to pre-empt the content of what could turn out to be a constructive dialogue. I find it useless. Baykal could have read the letter in the General Assembly, in a debate with the prime minister. He is twisting contexts rather deliberately.
Baykal also demands that the meeting be recorded. “We are afraid that the opinion perceives a closed-door meeting as if something is being cooked,” he says. Apparently, he is afraid that a civilized meeting, to discuss a matter of national reconciliation, security, prosperity, diversity, minority rights and freedom (coincidentally values of the Socialist International, whose members include even the CHP) will cause an erosion of his party's popularity. He does not need to worry: In many provinces, particularly in the mainly Kurdish Southeast and impoverished East, the CHP is almost nonexistent. When you hit rock bottom, the only way is up.
Baykal mentions in the letter that the CHP did issue reports on the Kurdish problem in 1989, 1991 and 2008, but seems utterly ambiguous on where he stands on key issues such as a change in the Constitution, the right to education in one's native tongue and a devolution of power, i.e., administrative reform. (In one part Baykal even hints at a clear opposition to amendments in the Constitution, saying that “these overlap with the terror organization's political goals.”)
Instead, he takes several steps back, to the robotic discourse of old days, focusing on how factories that close should be compensated, urging the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) to be finished quickly, advocating that “best quality schools in the region with the best teachers should be opened in the region,” new border gates be opened and “new projects on women” be launched.
These were the templates on the shelves of any unsuccessful political party in the 1990s.
Baykal skates around the most decisive issues by resorting to expressing his “concerns.” He adds nothing new to the response to a simple question: Why, then, did the CHP issue these comprehensive reports, if the content is simply hidden from the public? Or, this one: What will he do, if the Justice and Development Party says it will implement whatever part Baykal wishes from the CHP “reform packages”?
This is, therefore, rather discouraging for those who believed that a tête-à-tête between the leaders would ease tensions and raise hopes. Baykal is keen on not delivering any surprises on his style and stance. He will, particularly if the meeting is to be recorded, attempt to turn it into yet another political show with no content. In a closed-door meeting, everything will depend on how Erdoğan acts. If his “I have bet my political future on this issue” statement is true, he is expected to do his best to convince Baykal of the wisdom of a reasonable roadmap.
But let us all be on the side of extreme caution. The patterns of the old political class are still on display, and Baykal, representing the prototype of a politician in the Cold War days, might not fail to disappoint us.
