My impression from the colloquium was that the discussion on these topics was in fact shaped around France's refusal of Turkey's accession to the European Union. We noticed that the bilateral channels through which the countries can explain their positions and understand each other are not working anymore and the point is that the will to participate in a comprehensive dialogue does not even exist. It is sad that the old habit of neglecting the peoples' opinions and paying attention solely to the governments' attitudes still persists. It is also sad to see that the French media still perceives the Turkish military as the only power that will prevent Turkey from becoming more “conservative.”However, the very existence of this meeting proves that both countries need more frequent meetings, talks and debates. Before this meeting, we had no idea that France is currently curious about Turkey's attitude concerning the developments in Iran. We had the opportunity to explain that the possibility of having a nuclear Iran next door was not too disturbing according to Turkish public opinion and that most people in Turkey simply think that if Israel can have nuclear capabilities then why not Iran? We tried to explain that in order to understand why the Turkish people are not panicking about the Iranian nuclear issue, one should look at it from a different perspective. Besides, we said it is quite understandable that the Turkish government does not want to participate in an anti-Iran group as such a harsh stance would be criticized by the Turkish people.
We noticed that the Iran crisis may be used by those who want to drive Turkey away from the EU accession process. They probably hope that in the case of weighty international sanctions against Iran, Turkey would hesitate to apply them. If that were to happen, Iran, China, Russia and Muslims all over the world would be pleased, and some people hope that a positive atmosphere between Turkey, Iran, Russia and China would encourage Ankara to develop new kinds of regional cooperation instead of insisting on the EU path. Thus, Ankara would help the EU to get rid of Turkey.
Even though this is not an “impossible” scenario, there is no evidence suggesting that Turkey envisages such an attitude. It is true that Turkey's international role is rising following Russian-US rapprochement, but even if Turkey decides to change its track, this does not mean that the EU can get rid of Turkey. Because with the Lisbon Treaty, the EU may look for new stimulus at the domestic and international levels and Turkey's choices can still limit Europe's room to maneuver.
As the EU process occupies the center of the relationship between France and Turkey and as France does not seem willing to change its rhetoric, the normalization of bilateral relations is unlikely to happen in the short term. Nevertheless, it is worth trying to improve relations between the French and Turkish peoples. But if France tries to compel Turkey to make a difficult choice about Iran, then the dialogue between peoples will face great difficulties too. For many years, when the Turks and the French talked to each other, they frequently mentioned Cyprus, “genocide,” Algeria, military coups and de Gaulle. Now another point of friction concerning a “rogue state” risks being added to that list. Those who know how the futures of France and Turkey are intertwined must not allow this to happen.
