The new priorities of German foreign policy will be outlined in the Coalition Treaty between the Christian Democrats and Liberals, which should be available in six to eight weeks. Priorities are very likely to remain as under the previous government. Given Germany has returned to a “big” and “small” partner setup, Chancellor Merkel will probably have the most to say on foreign policy issues, with her foreign minister handling less spectacular issues. Furthermore, given that the likely foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, has no reputation as a foreign policy expert and during the election campaign he made very few (if any) statements connected to foreign policy, he will need time to fit into the shoes. Westerwelle has never occupied any government office; and his party has shown to have a neutral stance on most foreign policy issues, with the exception of strong trans-Atlantic links, which is in sink with Merkel. During the Free Democratic Party's (FDP) long period in opposition (11 years), the party mainly focused on economic issues, which is the topic that he gave most attention to during the election campaign -- stimulating the economy, creating jobs, reducing taxes. Therefore even though he will be the foreign minister, it will be Merkel who will continue to dominate until he manages to find his feet. It is also important to recognize that German's foreign policy has always been a field of political continuity -- the foreign office is a very established and professional institution and they will therefore probably shape the minister more than he shapes the ministry.
On relations with Russia, although the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) was one of Moscow's closest allies in the EU, the change of government will probably not have much of an impact, particularly given that Mrs. Merkel also maintains strong relations with the men in the Kremlin. Therefore, Germany will continue its past policy of rapprochement and close economic relations, hoping this would also be beneficial for the political situation in Russia. However, when it comes to energy, there could well be some changes because the revised German line on nuclear energy -- extending the lifetime of the existing reactors beyond 2020 -- will make Germany a bit less dependent on Russian gas, giving it more self-assurance, which will not only be of benefit to Germany but to the EU as a whole, given that it continues to suffer from too much division over energy relations with Russia.
When it comes to Turkey's EU accession progress, things will probably remain pretty much the same, neither getting much better nor much worse. Contrary to some media reports, the FDP is not excessively opposed to Turkish membership. Rather, it is generally quite positive, treating it less emotionally and more pragmatically. It clearly sees progress linked to action from Ankara and will be expecting Turkey to do some work. Therefore, one could expect a continuation of Berlin's current policy line. Over the last four years, Merkel has been quite modest in her critique and cannot be compared to French President Nicolas Sarkozy, for example. Meaning, Germany's leadership will be no keener on the idea and still talk about a privileged relationship, but at the same time it will stick to international obligations and treaties. At the end of the day Germany has no desire to undermine bilateral relations and slow down Turkey's reform process, which is beneficial to the EU. Therefore, it will avoid being the party that rocks the boat the hardest.
What should Turkey do? Stop complaining about unfair treatment and get on with reforms. Show those that are opposed to Turkish accession why they are wrong. Bring Turkey further in line with EU norms. Everyone will reap the results.
