These days Ankara has become far savvier in its foreign policy choices and how it deals with its partners and neighbors. For several years Turkey has been moving away from a hard power to an increasingly soft power, diplomacy-first policy. This new reality is based on Ankara's innovative strategic depth and the zero problems with neighbors approach which has been developed most recently by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu with the aim of ending disputes and increasing stability in Turkey's neighborhood, while at the same time expanding Turkey's sphere of influence.
Much of this change started following the tragic 1999 earthquakes that hit Turkey and Greece: the shared grief and outpouring of sympathy kick-started the rapprochement between the two foes. The other key developments were Turkey being accepted as a candidate country for European Union membership, which helped Ankara gain the confidence to develop a less hard-security, more democracy-based foreign policy and the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 when Turkey began to significantly improve relations with its neighborhood, to the south and east in particular, which had been, to say the least, frequently volatile under previous governments. These days animosity has been turned into friendship as Turkey continues to turn old policies on their heads. The ongoing rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, which continues to face tough opposition from both countries, will bring increased stability and prosperity to the entire region if its succeeds.
As well as repairing its own relationships, Turkey has also taken on numerous mediating efforts, demonstrating that thanks to its multiple regional identities it is in a unique position to deal with its diverse set of neighbors and beyond has quickly become a gifted regional broker, which was most recently demonstrated in its mediation between Iraq and Syria. Turkey was also one of the few countries to increase the number of troops it has in Afghanistan. The West has applauded these developments, even though from time to time some of the government's efforts have raised eyebrows and concerns (Erdoğan's outburst at the Davos World Economic Forum in January, the ill-fated visit of the newly elected Hamas leader to Turkey in 2006, the congratulations bestowed on the Iranian President after his recent election win are a few).
And while the West remains an important partner and US President Barack Obama has gone someway to repair the damage done to the relationship by his predecessor George W. Bush, Turkey is clearly no longer content to put all its eggs in one basket and readily align itself with everything on the table. A sign of this is Ankara's upgraded relationship with Moscow. Relations between the two countries have been improving over the last few years principally because of the increased tensions with Washington and difficulties with the EU, which continues to dither on the issue of Turkey's eventual membership. This new friendship with the Kremlin counterbalances this, but often results in a conflict of interest between Ankara and the West when Turkey chooses not to follow the West's policy on Russia. For example, Turkey, like Russia, opposes a large-scale US presence in the Black Sea and Ankara has never been overly outspoken on Georgia and Ukraine's NATO ambitions, while it only moderately criticized Russia's invasion of Georgia and its subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Turkey, heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies, chose not to take an isolationist stance with Russia but rather to engage the Kremlin, which has led to relations developing significantly over the last 12 months, in the energy sector in particular. Turkey is presently Russia's second largest outlet for natural gas and Russia now views Turkey as a possible new transit country for its energy resources rather than simply an export market.
Turkey and Russia together make quite a formidable team; therefore, it is important that the EU keeps Turkey strongly anchored in the membership process because any further deterioration may push Turkey further towards Russia. The increasingly close contact between Turkey and Russia in the post-Soviet political space over the last few years demonstrates the possible consequences of worsening relations between the West and Turkey. This could include, for example, pushing the EU further and further out of the Black Sea region.
This new “multifaceted” approach has put Turkey on the road to becoming a formidable regional power by consolidating power in its traditional Ottoman-era sphere of influence. Now that Turkey has reached its primary objectives it will continue to take advantage of the new geostrategic reality it finds itself in, whether or not it is always in the interest of its allies in the West. At the end of the day, Turkey is still the only the country in the region that has the capacity to deal with Iran, Syria, Israel and beyond, thereby Turkey will remain an invaluable -- but more independent -- political partner.
