As Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, recently pointed out, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) “could have chosen to continue the status quo,” but it has chosen to leave it behind.Long-applied patterns are being demolished, and a major “deconstruction” is under way. The redesign certainly has major repercussions, risks and promises.
The Oct. 1 opening of Parliament will signal a new phase. Inevitably, it will be marked by an ongoing, perhaps even more intense, political divide: More than ever, perhaps, it will test the prospects of compromise and risks for further polarity and will place political actors on a clearer map.
Four issues will be at stake: Turkish-Armenian “normalization,” the Kurdish “initiative,” Cyprus (eventually) and judicial reform.
In the first three, there is a consensus in the “state apparatus.” And they will have priority, in that order. Although the signals somehow blur the optics, the first issue will be relatively easy to deal with, compared to the second one. The chances of Ankara and Yerevan signing the two protocols do look closer than ever on the horizon, and mainly depending on the results of the intense diplomatic traffic expected in the first half of October between the foreign ministers of Turkey and Armenia and contacts between Baku and Yerevan on the issue of Karabakh, the opening of the land border before the soccer match, in as limited a time as can be, will be possible. More than any other actor, it is İlham Aliyev and his administration whose unpredictability should be noted with care. It is Azerbaijan that is most open to foreign influences, and manipulations.
Still, a swift symbolic move by Yerevan -- a minor, partial pullout of forces from one or two of the occupied Azeri territories -- increases the chances of a parallel “positive” move by Ankara.
Three of the major issues brought the two main opposition parties closer in attitude and rhetoric. Although the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has declared a full-scale political war against the government over all of them, both the MHP and the staunchly Kemalist Republican People's Party (CHP) know that the public, to a large extent, is not against Turkish-Armenian normalization. That is why the discourse of both Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli is focused on the “Azeri factor.” Yet, whatever the diplomatic efforts between the three actors may bring (or not), the opposition should not expect to gain much in their favor in terms of voter swing or support.
Therefore, inevitably, most of the energy in the fight, which is expected to be staged in Parliament from Oct. 1 on, will be about the thorniest issue of all. The so-called “Kurdish initiative” is based on the most fragile consensus in the state apparatus, the weakest link being the one between the government and the military. The longer the violence extends, killing more soldiers, the more difficult it will be to sustain it. It is where the opposition sees the “benefits for itself” and mobilizes its forces.
Although Ankara does not seem to be forcing the pace in the Kurdish “process,” it is a race against time, simply because this has been the issue more instrumentalized than any other to manipulate governments, parliaments and public opinion and because it involves a high number of domestic and international actors, some of whose patterns are horrifyingly unpredictable.
The road map is roughly known: Reforms on setting the Kurdish language “free” will be followed by repatriation of Kurdish residents from refugee camps such as Mahmur and an amnesty as comprehensive as possible. The process will not reach the stage of changing the Constitution: the political climate for that may only exist after the next elections.
The recent talks between the Democratic Society Party (DTP) leadership and Jalal Talabani and the positive involvement of Damascus -- which is said to be willing to accept Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) rebels of Syrian origin back into the country -- should be noted with the outmost care. A lot will also depend on whether PKK “rebel units” will be allowed to leave Turkish soil without facing military operations; it looks as if a “temporary, secret cease-fire” is looming on the horizon.
The government is acting correctly by insistently seeking consensus on the two issues I mentioned and should be commended fully. It is the opposition which will now step into the limelight with its more clear position. The intense battle from October on might be the final one on whether Turkey will leave the status quo behind -- or not.
