The MHP's criticism is not limited to Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), he even criticized the president and the National Security Council (MGK) when they declared their support for the process.Political observers think that the MHP has been benefiting from the Kurdish question; the existence of the problem helps the MHP to maintain the support of the Turkish nationalist constituents. In fact, in a climate where the Kurdish question dominates the public debate the MHP increases its votes. For instance, when Öcalan was arrested, the MHP was one of the beneficiaries.
Yet, this argument does not explain why the MHP is so furious because they would derive even more support from Turkish voters were the PKK to lay down its arms and the militants to return to Turkey and take part in politics. No doubt, the increasing visibility of “former terrorists” in politics would irritate the majority of Turkish constituents and irritated voters would go to the MHP. If the MHP successfully place the AK Party right next to the “former terrorists” and present it as the party that brought the terrorists into politics the MHP would easily increase its votes. When Öcalan was arrested in 1999 the MHP did not increase its votes because of the increasing visibility of the debate on the Kurdish issue in politics.
Thus, in the end, if the MHP increases its votes regardless, the MHP's anger must be related to something else. To understand why the MHP is acting like an incensed bully we need to understand whether the fury we see on TV every day is genuine or part of a calculated political strategy. I think that the MHP's calculation on the Kurdish initiative is somewhat different from that of the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the AK Party. What the MHP expects from the Kurdish initiative is a major failure that will greatly damage the AK Party. In this environment the MHP calculates it will be the absolute winner.
The MHP knows that whether or not it supports the Kurdish initiative, if it is implemented successfully and the PKK militants return to politics, the MHP's votes would increase because Turks annoyed by this would vote for the MHP, although the AK Party, as the champions of solving Turkey's long-lasting problem, would be the major beneficiary of the process. However, in the case of the process collapsing, which is very likely (the recent PKK attacks prove this), the MHP would benefit from the collapse of the process and get the AK Party constituencies' votes, too. I think the MHP's rage is a calculated political project that has been developed with the expectation that the Kurdish initiative will fail in the end.
In fact, at this stage, there are more reasons to expect that the Kurdish initiative will collapse. First, the statement by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) underlined the “red lines” that the government cannot easily erode. The issues, the nation state, only the Turkish language to be taught in schools, etc., are the gist of the problem that we have been dealing with for decades. If the Kurdish language is not going to be taught in schools, why are we talking about the Kurdish initiative in the first place? Will the Kurds be satisfied with empty talk? Similarly, the PKK does not really want peace either; the main reason being that the PKK leadership may lose its influence over the Kurdish question if they lay down their arms. The recent PKK attack, which claimed the lives of seven soldiers, is just one example of the PKK wanting to sabotage the peace process and not really wanting peace There are many unknown factors in the region that could derail the process at any time.
The MHP has developed its strategy based on the assumption that the Kurdish initiative will not bring the violence to an end. In that case, the MHP will sharpen its criticism toward the AK Party, pushing the government into a corner where it will be stuck between being a political alliance of the PKK and Turkish national desperation against the PKK.
In that situation, while the AK Party loses, the MHP would be the outright winner of the failed Kurdish initiative. With this strategy the MHP hopes to come to the power with a decisive victory, which, of course, would cause a major confrontation between Turkish and Kurdish chauvinism.
