Several of these peoples may fall into the parameters of a new state. In order to be a nation, they have to reconcile their differences and must be included in the nation as equal partners. If they are torn apart and become nation-states in their own right, they have to resolve their past grievances and misunderstandings in order to be good neighbors.The government of Turkey has recently decided to take on age-old problems, the gangrenous conflicts inherited from its imperial past both within and without. The Armenian and Kurdish problems are broader cases; they extend beyond national boundaries. The officially recognized minorities (Greek, Armenian and Jewish) as well as the unrecognized minorities (Kurdish, Assyrian, Chaldean and Yezidi) want full integration, legal equality and respect for their cultural differences. So far this has been virtually impossible because citizenship and nationhood has officially been ethnically defined (as Turkish).
Turkishness, as is often claimed, could have been a political and legal construct rather than an ethnic attribute. However, practices of the state and the legal system it relied on reduced it to an exclusive ethnic identity of part of the nation. Education (which is called “national education” in Turkey), both at the official level and the political level, upheld and legitimized this reductionist and uniformist understanding of nationhood.
In the end, all collective identities acquired a political role in order to be heard and counted. This strife confounded the political scene and reduced politics to an incessant conflict for dominance by the majority and the survival and resistance of the minorities. The dominant majority perceived this conflict situation as a threat to national security aggravated by traitors that are unfaithful to the regime and the country. This perception led to the “hammerization” of state institutions to do away with the problems which they saw as nails that stuck out. Violence spread further into the fabric of the society.
Lately Turkey, or rather the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party), has decided to solve the gangrenous problems that have been haunting Turkey for a century. Indeed these problems have seriously arrested the economic, social and political development of the country. But does the government enjoy enough popular support to untangle such problems? This is not entirely clear despite some polls showing public support for the government's initiatives having a slight edge.
All people want to improve their lives as well as their societies, but the dominant majority dread change, for change means uncertainty and the possible deterioration of what they have and who they are. Changing the basic tenets of the political system and the laws that uphold it means a thorough alteration of an education system that turns out Turkish nationalists rather than mere citizens without the perception of superior racial or ethnic qualities over others.
For a part of the society, this is like losing one's shell and feeling vulnerable. All of a sudden, old foes will become trustworthy partners, and “internal enemies,” with whom we have been fighting for decades, will become revered and equal citizens. This is a hard nut to chew and to swallow. Only the concerted action of state and civilian institutions and revered leaders toward consensus can make a difference. A well-planned and well-executed public outreach campaign that has the intention of sharing the vision of a brighter and more harmonious future that is agreed upon by community leaders and state actors can galvanize the majority of the people in support of change. Otherwise, the forces of the status quo and ad hoc popular resistance may render the government's initiatives inoperative.
This will have grave consequences. Turkish politics will once again freeze and lose its resilience. However, rigid things break easily.
