We know, more or less, that the issue and the harsh manners with which it was debated led to a division right in the middle of society. The western parts, in general, feel either skeptical or are categorically opposed to it, while the eastern and southeastern parts (except the eastern Black Sea strip) strongly back it. An interesting finding reveals the potential to change the political winds in the grass roots of the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). More than a third of CHP voters, says MetroPOLL, back, either fully or “partially,” the initiative. For MHP voters, it looks -- rather surprisingly -- like slightly less than a third. Moreover, those voting for the CHP who do not support Deniz Baykal's position on the issue is over 30 percent, while -- again surprisingly -- the MHP voters who are discontent about Devlet Bahçeli's stance are over 20 percent.
Up to 65 percent of Justice and Development Party (AKP) voters are behind the initiative. Democratic Society Party (DTP) voters -- expectedly -- almost completely support the initiative (over 95 percent).
Other noteworthy data concern the right for education to be in a person's native tongue. More than half of respondents (except parts of the Aegean region) think that it is a given right, and more than 53 percent support education in Kurdish (whether this is compulsory education is not clear).
MetroPOLL noted that all three leaders -- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Baykal and Bahçeli -- are seen as less reliable compared to the previous month.
The opinion poll shows that the percentage of votes each party would receive today would be more or less the same as the percentage they received during the March local elections.
This picture presented offers some food for thought. The division, although it openly contains risks of polarization, does display considerable instability in the undercurrents of the MHP and the CHP. This may help the government if it is concerned about the decisions and style so far. As the initiative “deepens,” the AKP may build a new strategy to appeal to the “internal dissent” within those adversaries. This remains to be seen.
The decreasing popularity (“trustworthiness”) noted by MetroPOLL can possibly be explained by the shouting match the debate has turned into. The citizens here have made it rather clear that they do not like to see dogfights and do not feel happy to hear slander, obscenities and insults. Decreased support for Erdoğan, while his party remains strong and is seen as reliable, should be interpreted as a sentiment of unease with his chosen style of rhetoric.
In this context, one point comes to the forefront as a curious one. When the AKP government launched its initiative concerning a new constitution a couple of years ago, the essence of the harsh criticism it received was based on the premise that it sought no consensus (because it had offered its own draft). Now, regarding the Kurdish initiative, the government -- to seek some sort of consensus or, at least, to create a common ground of understanding -- has chosen to be introverted, listened to the various segments of society, took notes, offered in vain to meet with the CHP and the MHP and became a target of another premise: We refuse to talk to you, the CHP and the MHP told the AKP, because we do not know what you have in mind.
This contradictive behavior will either go unexposed -- and succeed -- or become a reason for the cornering of both parties, pushing them into reasonable behavior, depending on the behavior of the AKP. So far, the former seems to apply: The CHP and the MHP, after pressure, succeeded in getting the top commander, İlker Başbuğ, to react, and this has helped the “no Kurdish reform” camp use it against the government. The focus was moved to the last and most difficult stages of the Kurdish reform: changes in the Constitution (“official language” and education) and threatened to undermine the debate. This move aims to consolidate the psychological barriers further.
Erdoğan should understand that calmness and patience will have to do. It is rather positive that some minor steps (ads in Kurdish on TRT) are already being taken. The government may win further ground in the ongoing psychological warfare by removing obstacles concerning the usage of Kurdish as a native tongue and address public reasoning in general, explaining (as Erdoğan did in his famous Aug. 10 speech) clearly that this bloodshed must stop and vendettas be brought to an end.
