Its main ingredients now include foreign powers' involvement, conspiracy theories, pure slander, “assessments” of the intelligence levels of political adversaries (falling slightly short of using the word “moron,” etc.), comparing the latest National Security Council (MGK) meeting to the infamous Armistice of Mudros (which declared the total defeat of the Ottoman Empire after World War I) -- well, anything you can expect in daily Turkish politics.Meanwhile, there is a clear point: The opposition, first the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and now the Republican People's Party (CHP), are targeting the military, strictly warning it against being an accomplice to those embarking upon a dangerous course and its dire consequences. The MHP, as I mentioned in my earlier piece here, has chosen this line strategically; it will seek to gain from it in the next national elections. The CHP, however, seems to tread on a line defined by tactics because its leader, Deniz Baykal, has changed his rhetoric considerably. He has made it clear he is keeping the doors open to -- at least -- talk to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in order to, among other things, look as if the CHP is a party which is pro-solution.
The military feels the heat. In a rather carefully worded statement yesterday, Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ clarified the armed forces' line. A reading of the text makes it obvious that the military generally stands behind the launched initiative. It emphasizes the need for steps in the domain of economy and culture, with regard to what is taking place in Iraq.
The nation-state and the unitary nature of the republic will not be allowed to be harmed, its says, and goes further: The armed forces respect cultural diversity, but they do not see it possible for the diversity to be politicized, used as a tool for political representation and developed as an element of sociopolitical identity. In other words, no politics based on ethnicity. The statement calls for care in order to not create polarization, “social clashes” and for the freedom to discuss to not lead to a tolerance of terrorism.
A final and important point in the statement suggests that, since the style and methods in processes often define the essence of the matters they are part of, they should be designed and followed with outmost care.
This means the army, while it reasserts its support for the initiative, is making obvious its discontent with the way the political debate is being conducted.
Indeed, at this very moment this has become an issue. The row has discouraged many pundits who started to air pessimism about the process, some even calling it “stillborn” or “having ended before it even began.”
Who is to blame? Certainly the entire political sphere -- the MHP, the CHP, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Democratic Society Party (DTP). But the expectation must be on the ruling party and its government. There is something peculiar about the complex AKP: It often (re)starts with good intentions, but gets lost in the process. This has led to the widespread belief that it is a powerful political force, powerful enough to launch processes and tempt the society (and the world) for change, but not powerful enough to take them to the very end.
This is, it is feared, what will happen with the highest risk game of all. The genie is out of the bottle -- to use a cliché -- and if the government does not fully grasp the value of the military backing for this process, its failure will be reflected in the next elections. Yet, there is no sign of a well-prepared “action plan” (not a “road map,” but a plan which outlines a method of public diplomacy), nor is there clarity on the issue of coordination as to who in the AKP will lead the process.
On the other hand, a false illusion is being created here that a “consensus” is necessary to take steps on the issue. The past seven years have shown that a consensus -- as we understand it -- is not possible in Turkish politics, so long as populism is dominant. Instead, the level of success in such an arduous path will be judged by how calmly and “to the point” the government will walk upon it. All the more so, the more alienated parties, such as the CHP, will feel and eventually move more to the “center.” Their opposition will therewith be forced to be more sensible and civilized. These are the ABCs of the AKP's task. We have yet to see whether or not it has drawn conclusions from its failed constitution process and if it will lead the way elegantly enough. Failure, this time, will cause an enormous disappointment and may have nasty repercussions.
