Whenever the debates about its (real) intent gained intensity, one argument for being optimistic -- albeit cautiously -- was kept alive because of the party's essence: Tt is full of surprises because it contains a representation for change, a reflection for transformation for the country in the direction of freedom and justice.All this despite the fact that pragmatism a la AK Party did not always overlap and progress with realism.
Two years after the historic election victory and a debilitating closure case, this year -- so far -- has become a reminder of a seemingly irreversible course for reform. Following another tumultuous process of revising civilian-military relations -- this time to limit the powers of the military courts -- the government shouldered the most straining task of all: the Kurdish issue and the final elimination of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) from the map of violence.
It would be fair to give President Abdullah Gül credit for the vision. He stood by firmly and calmly until the civilian-military row ended in a “cease-fire,” and reaffirmed his will to pave the way for launching the Kurdish initiative. Gül's perspective is obvious: Turkey should not be left paralyzed with this bleeding issue if it intends to be a peacemaking, respected regional power, and he believes that the fact that the consensus within the state for a solution overlaps with the international reality creates a fine momentum to go ahead.
There are four main points to his perspective for a realistic solution: improving all fundamental rights and freedoms for Turkey's Kurds, the issue of a comprehensive amnesty, ways to deal with the “criminal status” of Abdullah Öcalan, and political and economic reality that is Iraqi Kurdistan.
This roughly described vision shapes the framework of an action plan left to be matured. The hard part is in the hands of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the ball is in his court. Gül runs, as the coordinator of the state’s affairs, much less political risk than Erdoğan. The latter was the one who had to sit down and calculate the pros and cons of launching the initiative and facing confrontation with the next elections in mind.
His performance so far shows determination to go all the way, but very cautiously. Erdoğan's meeting over the weekend with leaders of non-Muslim communities added to his performance, which seems to be focused on keeping an ear on what the various segments of civil society say and building a common ground for a fresh leap of human rights reforms.
He calculates, obviously, that two elements will help ease the big risks he will take in the autumn, apart from the consensus I mentioned in the state apparatus:
First, the opposition is weak and routeless. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) may fail due to a possible miscalculation concerning the fatigue violence has created in society. The Republican People's Party (CHP) may be worse off; the confusion in its lower echelons and the fruitless political obstinacy based on reactionary policy made by its leadership may even lead to a crisis.
Second, the Ergenekon case’s progress is seen as politically encouraging for Erdoğan and his government; Turkey for has not been witnessing violence in urban areas for some time now. The AK Party has seemingly come to the conclusion that the containment of rogue, mafia elements opens a path for further reform.
At this stage, the defining factor for success will be how the enhanced reform plans are managed. Erdoğan needs a great dose of realism in addition to domestic and international encouragement. Antidemocratic elements may have been forced to defense, but the autumn period still entails provocation risks of all sorts. It must be clear to all, including the EU, that while the reality necessitates a buildup from minor steps to major ones (from by-laws to a new constitution), the pace must not be too slow. Once the road map is declared, a gigantic genie will be out of the bottle. The way back may have disastrous effects.
