The government launched a process with no possible U-turn when it declared its intention to introduce a policy whose general framework the government itself would determine. In this context, we can observe three important initiatives. First, the government has chosen to develop cooperation with the autonomous Kurdistan region in the northern Iraq, a region which represents the foreign aspect of Turkey's Kurdish problem. It has also signed “strategic” treaties with the Iraqi central government. Ankara benefited from full US support on this, and it has also managed to convince Russia that those who intend to use terrorism against Turkey will face difficulties in energy issues. Second, the government has emphasized the role of police forces rather than the army concerning the security aspects of the Kurdish issue, and the Interior Ministry has thus taken the forefront. In other words, the issue was transferred to the domestic domain. Thirdly, the government has decided to seek a large consensus to realize further steps.The Kurdish issue is not exclusively a “Kurdish” issue; it's the problem of everyone who lives in Turkey. It's the regime's main problem and should be resolved with a non-partisan approach. That's why the government attaches importance to civil society's reactions and other political parties' comments. It's clear that the search for a lasting solution will be useless if the government addresses only the Kurds' demands. That's why, while the president tries to win the Kurds' hearts by using Kurdish toponyms in his speeches, the prime minister recalls the suffering of fallen soldiers' mothers. We should admit that the government takes great risks, because there is the possibility of failure of the “opening” and the engaged parties can still be provoked by a serious terrorist attack, dispersing the optimistic atmosphere that reigns.
Even without any provocative incidents, nationalists of both sides seem to be angry enough. The positive atmosphere surrounding this issue creates a difficult situation for those who rely on Turkish and Kurdish nationalism because there are evident contradictions between concepts like nationalism and democratization, human rights and the redefining of the citizenship concept. In order to resist this opening, nationalists on both sides use rhetoric aimed at exploiting people's feelings. That attitude is sufficient to demonstrate how worried they are about losing their positions. But this also shows difficulties ahead for Turkey from now on. The line between criticizing the methods of the opening and criticizing the opening's content is very thin, and under the appearance of rejecting the methods, it seems that many people reject the content.
In addition, the main opposition party's attitude doesn't help the marginalization of Turkish and Kurdish nationalists either. This party even seems to share their intransigent attitude. As the Republican People's Party (CHP) considers the issue not as something that will determine the country's future, but only as a matter that will influence the governing party's next election results, it is focused on doing everything possible to invalidate the government's efforts. No matter what, they don't want to reconcile with the government they label as anti-secularist, but they don't notice that by taking this stance they indirectly help Kurdish separatism and they damage Turkey's democratization process. The Kurdish opening has shown once again that in Turkey there is a very serious “opposition problem.”
