Both the country and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) need a lasting solution. Wrong statecraft (denying the existence of minorities and full and equal rights for all citizens) and brutal suppression of even moderate demands and grievances are the root causes of the problem. The methods applied so far to end the problem have been so costly and counterproductive; not only could a solution not be produced, but the matter has taken Turkish politics and public life ransom. If the incumbent government wants to win the next national elections, it needs real impetus in solving the Kurdish problem, while economic recovery and membership in the European Union are questionable. But resolution of the Kurdish problem can guarantee electoral victory, and the people of Turkey will eternally be grateful to the AKP government. Having no real support from opposition parties (who believe their existence rests on opposing everything and anything the ruling party government does), success will be totally the AKP's. Yet there are pitfalls ahead.
First, the definition of the problem by the government and the bureaucratic establishments that have taken on the task of resolving it is unclear in the sense that their target seems limited to bringing the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) down from the mountains. For them, this is the heart of the problem, and if the PKK abandons its arms and disbands itself, the main concern will be re-integrating militants back into society. This narrow approach will never be accepted by the Kurds, especially the armed ones who still incite violence. They see the gist of the problem as an identity problem that needs to be officially acknowledged and that the Kurdish identity needs to be constitutionally guaranteed. That is why they want a new constitution that will replace the military-made (1982) present one in which citizenship is not defined as Turkish but rather as “inhabitants of Turkey” (commonly called constitutional citizenship rather than ethnic or religious based). Secondly, they want all restrictions lifted on the use of Kurdish. This includes teaching in Kurdish at schools and reclaiming personal and place names that were previously banned. They believe that without these changes, their legal and political equality will not be realized.
Indeed, the armed Kurdish militia has to come down from the mountains and give up their arms. The government wants them to disappear and not be visible ever again. (So many people wish the same.) But the PKK leadership wants to actively take part in politics and become part of the legal political scene in the country. Opposition parties dread this possibility and threaten to accuse the AKP government of treason should it allow it. No doubt, this condition will be the center of friction.
It was the official security policy to repress all more moderate Kurdish political organizations just because they were Kurdish. This way the Turkish establishment cleared the way for the most radical organizations, which proved to have the ability to stand before the mighty Turkish army. While the PKK was the byproduct of the Kurdish problem, it became the standard bearer of the cause and its representation. In this role, now the PKK demands to have a role in the solution, just as it was part of the problem.
It is almost certain that the government will try to “solve” the issue without the involvement of this organization, although the main aim of the so-called official “Kurdish initiative” is to eliminate or disband the PKK. However, the “issue” is far greater than the declared end, and there is no substantial evidence that this is officially understood as such.
As regards the timeframe of the “solution process,” recent official parlance created a sense of urgency, as if the problem had not been dragged on for decades. No doubt, it was the AKP who volunteered for the solution to take a political risk while hostilities are going on. But this was a calculated risk and if the issue is resolved by the 2011 elections, the AKP could make history. Of course, no one can deny the opportune moment afforded by the withdrawal of US-troops from Iraq, which has to be normalized and cleansed of unruly elements that may disrupt its internal peace and cause unnecessary confrontations with neighbors like Turkey.
This problem has engulfed the country for decades and reversing it may cause a frenzy. Confidence-building measures have to be agreed upon, public consent has to be secured, an unnamed amnesty has to be put into affect and the PKK's transformation into a legitimate political organization (maybe under another name) has to be realized. Formation of a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation to unearth crimes or the creation of a group of “wise men” to oversee the peace process and administrative decentralization are in line, but they are secondary. Yet they will be part of the process at some level. Let us see how realistic and comprehensive the government peace plan is. Will it shortly be matched by Abdullah Öcalan's “road map”? Shall we rejoice or will we be disappointed once again?
