It began with the words of Mr. Abdullah Gül, the president, when he said, “Wonderful things will happen soon.” Others began to talk of an “emerging consensus” for a solution to Turkey's gangrened “Kurdish problem.” We do not know how and what kind of consensus was realized between the state and the society and between the political and bureaucratic actors that seemed quite determined to keep up the age-old method of “using overwhelming force to quench violent opposition,” but the word itself created an aura of optimism.Government institutions began to work silently (we have not heard anything substantial yet concerning the “road map to peace” prepared by them). Then came the declaration of Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), who said he will publicize his “road map to peace” by mid August. Soon after, Kurdish groups came together with individuals from various backgrounds in Diyarbakır two weeks ago for a workshop with the same agenda. The Gülen movement had already paved the way by initiating a public discussion months ago.
Kurds close to the Democratic Society Party (DTP) who have organized the workshop are seeking unity among the Kurds and want to assure the PKK's leadership in the process. The government side wants to keep the initiative in its own hands. Its preparation is realized in the void of popular participation. Both the making of the problem (attributed to a non-existent ethnic group and everything associated with it) and the search for a solution are done officially without any popular involvement. Instead, the government says it resorts to “expert” advice and contribution. One gets the jitters when one talks about experts. It was those experts who aggravated the problem by denying the cultural plurality of this country, worshipped the state while trying to subdue the nation and treated every social problem like a nail to pound on with indiscriminate violence.
What is positive about the current aura of optimism is that 1) the understanding that a solution with other instruments than mere counter-violence is gaining ground, 2) the problem has for the first time been named correctly (“Kurdish problem”) although its content is unclear, 3) the solution will take time and it has to be implemented gradually. Everything cannot be achieved at one time is the general feeling. The last point is healthy to keep hopes at a realistic level. It is obvious that after waging a civil war for a quarter of a century, the normalization of relations between the “internal enemy” and the majority that was organized and motivated to fight against it will take time, needs patience and a coordinated effort of all organs of society and the state apparatus. The latter is the most difficult because warfare has given birth to special privileges and political premium to certain bureaucratic cadres and political parties.
The minister of interior has made optimistic remarks about a possible solution, and then he added, “As you know, we also have a terrorism problem to deal with.” If the Kurdish problem is dissociated from violent opposition that emanates from it, then we have two problems, two approaches, two road maps and two parties to heed. The party to reach a deal with has to be the Kurdish citizens of Turkey and their civic-political organizations. So far Turkish laws have not allowed political parties based on ethnic identity. In fact, previous efforts have been aborted by closure. The only current Kurdish political organ is the DTP, and neither the government nor the opposition takes this organization as a party to discuss a road map to peace on the grounds that it as an accessory to terrorism.
Similarly, we have yet to hear of a government initiative such as holding a public opinion survey with the intention of unearthing Kurdish feelings and expectations. So the party to deal with in solving the Kurdish problem does not seem to be the Kurdish people in general but rather the officialdom that claims to act on their part.
As regards putting an end to violence, the de facto party in the conflict is the PKK that has proved the tenacity of enduring a tough struggle that lingered on for two and a half decades. This organization is a product of the Kurdish problem, but in time it has acquired a central role by which it began to shape and to manage it. The PKK is organically related to “the problem” but it has grown autonomous of the Kurdish people in whose name it has carried on an armed struggle with an unending source of human supply who felt victimized all along.
Having said these things, the question to be answered is how can the “Kurdish problem” and the violence issue be solved without any reference to or involvement of the groups who are part to the problem, especially when Kurdish deputies of the ruling party are silenced by the party administration?
