Unlike the procedure applied in the election of the former four presidents, the absolute majority in the third round was forsaken and the two-thirds rule all around was upheld by the Constitutional Court. This move was unconstitutional in principle and the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) resorted to the last source of legitimacy to bypass the problem of bureaucratic tutelage over the system, bringing the issue to public preference. Mr. Gül was elected by popular vote and with a convincing majority. Such a forceful demonstration of popular will could not be challenged and the power elite swallowed the fact. But they did not give in. The judiciary on the one hand and the military bureaucracy on the other continued to exercise their power over public and state affairs provided by a legal system concocted after the 1980 coup.The premise of the Council of State was attacked by members of the so-called Ergenekon gang with the guise that they protested the anti-headscarf stance of the members of this high court. Soon after the interrogation of the perpetrators revealed that this was a disguise to discredit the AKP and religious circles. Yet, despite the fact that a member of the court was slain and a few others wounded, some of the remaining members of the Council of State continued to voice their concern of being the target of religious zealots.
A law was recently adopted that enables members of the military to be judged in civilian courts if their breaches of law do not strictly concern military affairs. The same law also intends to put an end to the anomaly of judging civilians in military courts based on a broad interpretation of their acts as anti-military. For example, a conscientious objector is judged and prosecuted based on a law dealing with “discouraging citizens from military duty.”
The new law was opposed by both the so-called social democratic People's Republican Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), with both betraying their raison d'être. Defending the state over the people and rendering the latter subservient to the former is neither leftist nor nationalistic because the nation is reduced to an insignificant horde to be pushed around by those who are not accountable to the nation.
Why do these parties oppose such a progressive law, one that can open the door to a more democratic system? There is more than one answer to this question, but the shortest and most direct one is their fear of the AKP's influence as an agent of change and its continuing popularity, which they cannot match. If the AKP succeeds in building democratic and civilian rule -- despite its own shortcomings as a leader-oriented organization with limited democratic experience in the past of many of its foregoing members, authoritarian parties that uphold values which center on state control of society will vanish from political life or be reduced to insignificance.
That is why their propaganda against both the ongoing Ergenekon trial and legal changes, including making a new constitution and the latest law enabling military personnel to be judged in civilian courts in case they engage in unprofessional acts such as coup attempts, emphasizes their concern of the AKP consolidating its position in the system. This system was created by them and now a party that owes little to the state for its ascendance to power is taking over. Moreover, this party is not even secular (or secular enough) and represents those lower echelons of society that can neither be trusted nor heeded as pacesetters.
What they cannot see is that this tutelary and anachronistic system has lost its momentum and costs a lot to the nation. This country is neither prosperous nor enjoys a pluralist and deliberative political system despite its rich cultural and ethnic pluralism. It has fallen way behind Western countries that Turkey measures itself with. It has squandered its human and material resources on pseudo solutions that rest on expensive and violent methods, such as the Kurdish problem. What they also miss is that, once the voice of opposition groups with a fundamental statement of being victimized, the AKP helped many who felt that way to have a place in the system, thus making it more inclusive. As these groups rose in social and financial status, they reconciled with the system they frequently opposed. The system became more inclusive and pluralistic. This was too much for those who once had their way and the say to determine the fate of the nation. They are trying to defend a fortress where defense is no more made within walls but on principles. They will soon realize this, but at what cost to the nation?
