Officers were cut off from the military to allow for the creation of an army that would safeguard the newly established order. Subsequent coup attempts yielded similar results.Coups, by nature, initially involve a power struggle within the military. This has been the tradition since the activities of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti). Discharges following May 27 aimed to cleanse the TSK of different opinions and to ensure the survival of a tutelage regime by a uniformed staff within the chain of command. But plans didn't go as expected. Conflicts of interest and power struggles led to new groupings or new junta formations. The March 9 junta in 1971 and the March 12, 1971 coup following Talat Aydemir's two coup attempts are all results of this foul situation. The Sept. 12, 1980 coup, which was plotted within the chain of command, inevitably recalls internal conflict that took place within the army prior to the coup. Kenan Evren, the commander of the Aegean Army and awaiting retirement, was quickly made chief of general staff though he was a very unlikely candidate for the position.
When we look at the more recent past, everything begins to make more sense. Names such as Gen. Muhittin Fisunoğlu were always considered suspicious and therefore closely followed. Although the Feb. 28, 1997 process appeared like an intervention in the chain of command, the tenaciousness of Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Çevik Bir and his team was known to everyone. It was clear that Bir, who had become a social engineer, was actually just trying to build his personal career. There was no way he could become the chief of general staff, but that did not stop him from pushing the limits. The things he did until Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu was appointed chief of general staff were a case in point. Clouds of suspicions over the death of Vural Berkay, who was killed by a bullet that barely missed Kıvrıkoğlu during a military exercise, did not go away over time but rather got bigger and darker.
The journal entries of former navy commander Adm. Özden Örnek detailed what former Chief of General Staff Gen. Hilmi Özkök experienced. Having to bring your own food from home out of fear of being poisoned is difficult and distressing enough for a general. We saw how Gendarmerie Forces Commander Gen. Şener Eruygur set up his own junta to win the power struggle after failing to win the support of other force commanders. We saw how the battle, which seemed as if it was being carried out against the political ruling power, was actually taking place within the TSK.
An atmosphere was created through supportive media organizations to first bring down the chief general. They even attempted to hold Özkök accountable for the past three decades of terrorism. Documents seized from the Ergenekon junta reveal that even former Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt and current Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ have been categorized and subject to psychological war operations.
When I heard about the arrest of three lieutenants in İstanbul, all events that recently transpired flashed in front of me. Whether the three lieutenants who are being charged for planning to kill naval forces admirals have links to the Ergenekon terror organization have not been confirmed, but I could not help but recall them when I thought about the young Ergenekon suspect military officers that collected intelligence on their superiors.
The Ergenekon members' biggest lie is that the Turkish military institutionally and existentially supports it. Many events make it clear that the majority is against the group in question. It is no surprise that the same people who want more than they deserve are the same people who are involved in juntas. Members of the TSK are more aware of this then anyone else. Those who use politics to advance their positions and to win internal conflicts anger the TSK the most. Cleaning out junta supporters is a matter of domestic peace within the TSK.
