That such schemes exist is not a matter of great contention. There is a huge conspiracy trial currently going on against what prosecutors say was a well-organized and long-standing “network -- whose tentacles extend to the press, into a paramilitary underground and into the government bureaucracy and whose aim was to plough the way for a military coup.” Defendants in this “Ergenekon” trial also include retired members of the military. More recent newspaper revelations, yet to be substantiated in a court of law, also suggest that the armed forces maintain a unit dedicated to dreaming up special ops to discredit the government and keep it on a short leash.So, on the surface it would seem a good thing that the government is trying to assert the authority of the rule of law and the accountability of elected officials. After all, Turkey has a history of military interventions in politics. Much of the legislation attending the 1982 Constitution has been revised, but the spirit of that document -- which legitimates a political role for the military and of a non-elected authority -- is still alive. The last actual coup might have taken place in 1980, but the General Staff made no secret of their distrust of the present government in 2007, particularly the Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) presidential nominee. The European Union, which Ankara aspires to join, winces every time Turkey's generals wave their swords. Brussels has long insisted that the military be put more squarely under civilian control.
Yet not everyone is pleased. Turkey's opposition says it was hoodwinked into passing what they regard as an unconstitutional act. They say the bill was rushed into law late Friday night, concealed within a larger legislative package, and have appealed to the president to use his veto. These complaints might seem just another politically motivated moan. Yet Turkey's largest business confederation, the Turkish Businessmen's and Industrialists' Association (TÜSİAD), one of the most outspoken advocates of Turkish EU entry, also now accuses the government of behaving recklessly in passing what under normal circumstances might be seen as harmonization legislation. The main criticism appears to be not the substance of the legislation but that it was not part of a larger reform package. The government, in TÜSİAD's eyes, is guilty of cherry-picking its reforms, passing measures which strengthen its own hand at the expense of the military but ignoring equally pressing legislation that would make politicians more accountable. For example, senior officers can now be hauled before the courts but ordinary civil servants can only be tried or investigated after authorization from their superior. The opposition press, too, is opposed to the new legislation. Turkey largest press group (a family member of whom now heads TÜSİAD) has their own private motives for calling the government to task, but the point remains that the AK Party's efforts to rein in the military might have seemed more sincere if they had been bundled together with measures to expand the rights of women, Kurds and the Alevi religious minority. If the government were bent on impressing the EU, it could have applied to the courts to lift the ban on YouTube.
The military maintains that it must now face harassment by a not very reliable legal process. The AK Party has the satisfaction that the next time the generals plot to shut it down, those same courts can be used to pursue the General Staff. At the same time, the government must know that seeking confrontation with its own soldiers will win it few friends or even votes. It is not just the business community that would be anxious about an increase in tension.
The government can argue that it is impossible to swing open the gate for greater reform while there is a tank parked out in front. Yet it must know that argument would be far more plausible if it had shown itself more committed to change. At the moment it has convinced only its own supporters of its good intentions.
